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Figure 1: The Global Risks Landscape 2015
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Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2014.
Note: Survey respondents were asked to assess the likelihood and impact of the individual risks on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 representing a risk that is not likely to happen or have 
impact, and 7 a risk very likely to occur and with massive and devastating impacts. See Appendix B for more details. To ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are 
abbreviated. Also see Appendix A for the full name and description.
Table A: Global Risks 2015
Table B: Trends 2015
Asset bubble in a major economy
Deflation in a major economy 
Energy price shock to the global economy
Failure of a major financial mechanism or institution
Failure/shortfall of critical infrastructure 
Fiscal crises in key economies 
High structural unemployment or underemployment
Unmanageable inflation
Extreme weather events (e.g. floods, storms, etc.)
Failure of climate-change adaptation
Major biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse (land or ocean)
Major natural catastrophes (e.g. earthquake, tsunami, volcanic eruption, geomagnetic storms)
Man-made environmental catastrophes (e.g. oil spill, radioactive contamination, etc.)
Failure of national governance (e.g. corruption, illicit trade, organized crime, impunity, political deadlock, etc.)
Interstate conflict with regional consequences
Large-scale terrorist attacks
State collapse or crisis (e.g. civil conflict, military coup, failed states, etc.)
Weapons of mass destruction
Failure of urban planning
Food crises
Large-scale involuntary migration
Profound social instability
Rapid and massive spread of infectious diseases
Water crises
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure and networks
Large-scale cyber attacks
Massive incident of data fraud/theft
Massive and widespread misuse of technologies (e.g. 3D printing, artificial intelligence, geo-engineering, synthetic biology, etc.)
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Figure 2: The Global Risks 2015 Interconnections Map
Risk Interconnection Map
Economic
Risks
Geopolitical
Risks
Environmental
Risks
Societal
Risks
Technological
Risks
Number and strength
of connections
(“weighted degree”)
Asset bubble
Deflation
Energy price shock
Failure of financial 
mechanism or institution
Failure of critical infrastructure
Fiscal crises
Unemployment or 
underemployment
Unmanageable inflation
Extreme weather events
Failure of climate-
change adaptation
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Natural catastrophes
Man-made environ-
mental catastrophes
Failure of 
national governance
Interstate conflict
Terrorist attacks
State collapse
or crisis
Weapons of mass destruction
Failure of urban planning
Food crises
Large-scale
involuntary migration
Profound 
social instability
Spread of infectious diseases
Water crises
Critical information
infrastructure breakdown
Cyber attacks
Data fraud or theft
Misuse of
technologies
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2014.
Note: Survey respondents were asked to identify between three and six pairs of global risks they believe to be most interconnected. See Appendix B for more details. To 
ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are abbreviated. Also see Appendix A for the full name and description.
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This 10th edition of the Global Risks 
report is published at a time of profound 
transformations to our global context. 
Ongoing political, economic, social, 
environmental and technological 
developments are challenging many of 
our underlying assumptions. Across 
every sector of society, decision-makers 
are struggling to cope with heightened 
complexity and uncertainty resulting 
from the world’s highly interconnected 
nature and the increasing speed of 
change. 
Faster communication systems, closer 
trade and investment links, increasing 
physical mobility and enhanced access 
to information have combined to bind 
countries, economies and businesses 
more tightly together. In the coming 
decade – the time horizon of this report 
– our lives will be even more intensely 
shaped by transformative forces that are 
under way already. The effects of 
climate change are accelerating and the 
uncertainty about the global geopolitical 
context and the effects it will have on 
international collaboration will remain. At 
the same time, societies are increasingly 
under pressure from economic, political 
and social developments including 
rising income inequality, but also 
increasing national sentiment. Last but 
not least, new technologies, such as the 
Internet or emerging innovations will not 
bear fruit if regulatory mechanisms at 
the international and national levels 
cannot be agreed upon. 
In a world where risks transcend 
borders and sectors, the motivations 
underlying the Global Risks report at its 
inception in 2005 – to shed light on 
global risks and help create a shared 
understanding of the most pressing 
issues, the ways they interconnect and 
their potential negative impacts – are 
more relevant than ever. The shared 
understanding of challenges is needed 
as a base for multistakeholder 
collaboration, which has seen 
increasing recognition as the most 
effective way to address global risks and 
build resilience against them. To further 
inspire action, in this year’s report we 
include a new section sharing examples 
of risk mitigation and resilience 
practices.
As in previous years, the report is based 
on the annual Global Risks Perception 
Survey, completed by almost 900 
members of the World Economic 
Forum’s global multistakeholder 
community. This year’s report 
introduces a new distinction between 
risks and trends, which allows the 
highlighting of trends as an enlarged 
solution space to many possible risks. 
The report also presents deep-dive 
discussions of the risks posed by a 
resurgence of interlinked economic and 
geopolitical power plays, the rapid 
urbanization of the developing world 
and the exciting realm of emerging 
technologies, from synthetic biology to 
artificial intelligence. 
The coming year offers unprecedented 
opportunities for much-needed 
collective action to address key global 
risks, such as the Sendai world 
conference on disaster risk reduction 
and the 2015 United Nations Climate 
Change Conference in Paris. As we 
mark the 10th anniversary of the report 
and highlight progress that has been 
achieved over the past decade, my 
hope remains that this work will 
contribute to the debate on how we 
think about global risks, mitigate them 
and strengthen resilience.
 
Klaus Schwab
Founder and Executive Chairman 
World Economic Forum
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Foreword
Collaboration across countries, areas of 
expertise and stakeholder groups is 
necessary to effectively address global 
risks. As one of the flagship reports of 
the World Economic Forum, the Global 
Risks report has been a collaborative 
effort since its first edition in 2006. 
Produced within the World Economic 
Forum’s forward looking networked 
think tank, the Centre for Global 
Strategies, the report is able to draw on 
unique expertise available within the 
different communities and the 
knowledge networks of the World 
Economic Forum as well as within the 
organization as a whole. 
The 2015 edition has established a 
Steering Board to provide strategic 
guidance as well as a high-level 
multistakeholder Advisory Board for 
advising on the methodology and the 
content of the report. The report’s 
corporate partners, academic advisors, 
and members of the Advisory Board 
contributed greatly to this endeavour. It 
also strongly builds on ongoing 
research, projects, debates and 
initiatives within the World Economic 
Forum. The insights presented here are 
the result of numerous discussions, 
consultations, and workshops and 
reflect the views of leaders from our 
various communities through the Global 
Risks Perception Survey.
With this in mind, I would like to thank 
our corporate report partners, Marsh & 
McLennan Companies and Zurich 
Insurance Group, represented on the 
Steering Board by John Drzik, 
President, Global Risk and Specialties, 
Marsh, and Axel Lehmann, Member, 
Group Chief Risk Officer, Zurich 
Insurance Group. Further, I am grateful 
to our academic advisers the National 
University of Singapore, Oxford Martin 
School at the University of Oxford and 
the Wharton Risk Management and 
Decision Processes Center at the 
University of Pennsylvania.
The report has also greatly benefited 
from the dedication and valuable 
guidance of the members of the Global 
Risks 2015 Advisory Board. Members 
are Rolf Alter, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and 
Development; Mario Blejer, Banco 
Hipotecario; Oliver Chen, Global 
Valuation, who represents the National 
University of Singapore; Megan Clark, 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organization; Marie-Valentine 
Florin, International Risk Governance 
Council; Julian Laird, Oxford Martin 
School; Pascal Lamy, Notre Europe – 
Jacques Delors Institute; Ursula von der 
Leyen, Federal Minister of Defence of 
Germany; Erwann Michel-Kerjan, the 
Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania; Moisés Naím, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace; 
Jonathan Ostry, International Monetary 
Fund; Manuel Pulgar-Vidal Otalora, 
Minister of Environment of Peru; Nouriel 
Roubini, New York University; Anders 
Sandberg, University of Oxford; Richard 
Smith-Bingham, Marsh & McLennan 
Companies; Michelle Tuveson, 
University of Cambridge; Margareta 
Wahlström, United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction; and 
Steve Wilson, Zurich Insurance Group.
I am also grateful to Margareta Drzeniek 
Hanouz, Lead Economist and Head, 
Global Competitiveness and Risks, and 
the Global Risks 2015 project team 
members Ciara Browne, Jonathon Cini, 
Roberto Crotti, Attilio Di Battista, Gaëlle 
Dreyer, Caroline Galvan, Thierry Geiger, 
Tania Gutknecht and Cecilia Serin for 
their contributions to the report. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank 
the respondents that completed the 
Global Risks Perception Survey.
Espen Barth Eide 
Managing Director  
and Member of the Managing Board
World Economic Forum
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The 2015 edition of the Global Risks 
report completes a decade of 
highlighting the most significant 
long-term risks worldwide, drawing on 
the perspectives of experts and global 
decision-makers. Over that time, 
analysis has moved from risk 
identification to thinking through risk 
interconnections and the potentially 
cascading effects that result. Taking 
this effort one step further, this year’s 
report underscores potential causes as 
well as solutions to global risks. Not 
only do we set out a view on 28 global 
risks in the report’s traditional 
categories (economic, environmental, 
societal, geopolitical and technological) 
but also we consider the drivers of 
those risks in the form of 13 trends. In 
addition, we have selected initiatives for 
addressing significant challenges, 
which we hope will inspire collaboration 
among business, government and civil 
society communities.
Mapping Global Risks in 
2015
The Global Risks Landscape, a map of 
the most likely and impactful global 
risks, puts forward that, 25 years after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, “interstate 
conflict” is once again a foremost 
concern (see Table 1). However, 2015 
differs markedly from the past, with 
rising technological risks, notably cyber 
attacks, and new economic realities, 
which remind us that geopolitical 
tensions present themselves in a very 
different world from before. Information 
flows instantly around the globe and 
Executive 
Summary
A global risk is an uncertain 
event or condition that, if it 
occurs, can cause significant 
negative impact for several 
countries or industries within 
the next 10 years. 
A trend is defined as a long-
term pattern that is currently 
taking place and that could 
amplify global risks and/or 
alter the relationship between 
them. 
emerging technologies have boosted 
the influence of new players and new 
types of warfare. At the same time, 
past warnings of potential 
environmental catastrophes have 
begun to be borne out, yet insufficient 
progress has been made – as reflected 
in the high concerns about failure of 
climate-change adaptation and 
looming water crises in this year’s 
report.
These multiple cross-cutting 
challenges can threaten social stability, 
perceived to be the issue most 
interconnected with other risks in 2015, 
and additionally aggravated by the 
legacy of the global economic crisis in 
the form of strained public finances and 
persistent unemployment. The central 
theme of profound social instability 
highlights an important paradox that 
has been smouldering since the crisis 
but surfaces prominently in this year’s 
report. Global risks transcend borders 
and spheres of influence and require 
stakeholders to work together, yet 
these risks also threaten to undermine 
the trust and collaboration needed to 
adapt to the challenges of the new 
global context. 
The world is, however, insufficiently 
prepared for an increasingly complex 
risk environment. For the first time, the 
report provides insights on this at the 
regional level: social instability features 
among the three global risks that 
Europe, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and the Middle East and 
North Africa are least prepared for. 
Other societal risks, ranging from the 
failure of urban planning in South Asia 
to water crises in the Middle East and 
North Africa, are also prominent. And 
capacity to tackle persistent 
unemployment – an important risk 
connected with social instability – is a 
major concern in Europe and sub-
Saharan Africa.
As in previous years, Part 2 explores 
three risk constellations that bear on 
the survey findings. In 2015, these are:
Interplay between geopolitics and 
economics: The interconnections 
between geopolitics and economics 
are intensifying because states are 
making greater use of economic tools, 
from regional integration and trade 
treaties to protectionist policies and 
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Table 1: The Ten Global Risks in Terms of Likelihood and Impact
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2014, World Economic Forum.
Top 10 global risks in terms of 
Likelihood 
Categories
Interstate conflict  
Extreme weather events
Failure of national governance
State collapse or crisis 
Unemployment or underemployment
Natural catastrophes
Failure of climate-change adaptation
Water crises
Data fraud or theft
Cyber attacks
Top 10 global risks in terms of 
Impact
Water crises
Weapons of mass destruction
Interstate conflict
Energy price shock
Failure of climate-change adaptation
Fiscal crises
Unemployment or underemployment
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
Spread of infectious diseases
Critical information infrastructure breakdown
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The Global Risks Perception 
Survey 2014 gathered the 
perceptions of almost 900 
members of the World 
Economic Forum’s 
multistakeholder community 
between July and September 
2014. 
cross-border investments, to establish 
relative geopolitical power. This 
threatens to undermine the logic of 
global economic cooperation and 
potentially the entire international 
rule-based system. 
Urbanization in developing 
countries: The world is in the middle of 
a major transition from predominantly 
rural to urban living, with cities growing 
most rapidly in Asia and Africa. If 
managed well, this will help to incubate 
innovation and drive economic growth. 
However, our ability to address a range 
of global risks – including climate 
change, pandemics, social unrest, 
cyber threats and infrastructure 
development – will largely be 
determined by how well cities are 
governed. 
Governance of emerging 
technologies: The pace of 
technological change is faster than 
ever. Disciplines such as synthetic 
biology and artificial intelligence are 
creating new fundamental capabilities, 
which offer tremendous potential for 
solving the world’s most pressing 
problems. At the same time, they 
present hard-to-foresee risks. 
Oversight mechanisms need to more 
effectively balance likely benefits and 
commercial demands with a deeper 
consideration of ethical questions and 
medium to long-term risks – ranging 
from economic to environmental and 
societal.
Mitigating, preparing for and building 
resilience against global risks is long 
and complex, something often 
recognized in theory but difficult in 
practice. Against this backdrop, Part 3 
features three proven or promising 
initiatives that were instituted in 
response to extreme weather events 
and climate-change adaptation. The 
modelling of the Murray-Darling Basin 
river system in Australia has pioneered 
innovative methods of water 
management that are now being 
adapted for use elsewhere in the world. 
The Resilient America Roundtable is 
currently helping selected local 
communities across the United States 
to understand how they might be 
affected by different risks and then 
design resilience strategies. ZÜRS 
Public, part of an extensive flood 
management programme in Germany, 
is a public-private collaboration that for 
several years now has been a tool for 
communicating with homeowners and 
businesses about their exposure to 
flood risk.
Over the past 10 years, the Global 
Risks report has raised awareness of 
the dangers from the interconnected 
nature of global risks and has 
persistently called for multistakeholder 
collaboration to address them. By 
offering a broad-ranging overview from 
risk identification and evaluation to 
practices – from the “what” to the 
“how” – this year’s report aims to 
provide the most comprehensive set of 
insights yet for decision-makers in its 
decade-long history.
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For the past decade, the Global 
Risks report – now in its 10th edition 
– has been calling attention to global 
risks and providing tools to support 
decision-makers in their efforts to 
mitigate or prevent global risks or 
strengthen resilience against them. 
Since its inception, the report has 
raised awareness that the world 
is increasingly interconnected and 
that global risks cannot be seen in 
isolation. On the contrary, they can 
have far-reaching cascading effects 
as demonstrated by the financial 
crisis in 2008 and its socio-economic 
consequences. The year 2014 alone 
witnessed several such risks with 
potentially broad implications in the 
years to come if history serves as a 
benchmark: the frozen relationship 
between Russia and the West – 
unfathomable to most just one year 
ago – seems to be transporting the 
world back to a time when geopolitics 
took primacy. The conflict in Syria and 
the spread of the Islamic State in the 
region have set off unprecedented 
migration flows into neighbouring 
countries and Europe, which could 
impact social cohesion if poorly 
managed. Revelations about data 
fraud and leaks and cyber espionage 
have critically undermined global trust, 
running the risk of complicating the 
search for solutions to other global 
governance challenges as well. 
Successfully addressing these complex 
and interconnected issues necessitates 
greater multistakeholder cooperation 
to increase the capacity to foresee, 
manage and mitigate global risks and 
to strengthen society’s preparedness 
and resilience to them. The report 
takes the first step towards establishing 
comprehensive collaboration by 
fostering a shared understanding of the 
issues at hand.  
10 Years of Risk 
Awareness Building
Over the past decade, the Global Risks 
report has seen both its readership 
and its impact increase significantly. 
The report has become a useful tool 
for many governments and businesses 
to assess their exposure to global risks 
(see Box 1). It has also successfully 
raised awareness on key risks, such as 
the threat of increasing resistance to 
Introduction
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antibiotics, which was featured in 2013, 
or important IT-related risks, which 
are now at the forefront of business 
concerns.
After 10 years, the World Economic 
Forum is now also in a position to 
revisit the first Global Risks report, 
an endeavour that illustrates both 
the difficulty and the necessity of 
attempting to think 10 years ahead. 
The economic risk given most attention 
in 2007 was the possibility of an asset 
price bubble, which set off a major 
financial crisis in the same year. The 
subsequent years were primarily 
defined by potential risks related to the 
stability of financial systems in many 
countries and the threat of sovereign 
default, resulting in an economic 
meltdown the world is still recovering 
from. The interconnected nature of the 
global economy today and the scale of 
the global financial crisis show the need 
to look beyond the obvious for risk 
interconnections.
Importantly, this 10th edition also 
reflects a decade of learning and 
methodological improvements. 
Fundamentally, the report’s approach 
remains the same – to identify global 
risks and their interactions, and to 
assess them on two dimensions: 
their perceived likelihood and impact. 
However, over the years, a number of 
refinements have been made to the 
methodology, reflecting the lessons 
learned from 10 years’ experience in 
this field. This year’s edition features 
an updated methodology based 
on input from the members of the 
newly established Advisory Board 
(the list of members appears in the 
Acknowledgements section at the end 
of this report).
The uncertainty associated with 
risks, their interconnected nature and 
often the absence of data make it 
difficult to accurately quantify a range 
of risks – for example social unrest, 
cyber attacks or oil price shocks. A 
survey is therefore a suitable tool to 
get a sense of the order of magnitude 
of the impact and likelihood of risks. 
The qualitative, perceptions-based 
approach embodied in the Global 
Risks Perception Survey has been 
the base of the World Economic 
Forum’s work in this area since 2011, 
capturing the views of decision-makers 
Box 1: How has the Global 
Risks report been used?
A range of stakeholders were asked 
how they used the Global Risks 
report series over the last 10 years. 
The most common answers were 
to:
♦ develop scenarios;
♦ prepare crisis exercises; 
♦ assess vulnerabilities and their 
potential for cascade effects;
♦ inform “sense making” exercises 
in crisis situations;
♦ train top decision-makers;
♦ model risks external to the direct 
business environment. 
from the Forum’s multistakeholder 
constituencies on the perceived 
impact and probability of risks 
and the interconnections between 
them. Perceptions allow us to better 
understand decision-makers’ priorities, 
which in turn influence their decisions.
Over the years, the reports have 
put increasing emphasis on the 
interconnected nature of global risks 
and the potential spillover effects of 
systemic risks, putting this aspect 
of risks on the agenda. The resulting 
complexities underscore the difficulties 
stakeholders face when addressing 
risks and are reflected in this edition’s 
introduction of trends as drivers of 
risks. As a result, there is increased 
emphasis on going beyond the analysis 
of global risks to include suggestions 
on what stakeholder alliances can do 
about them. The focus on solutions 
in this edition is the strongest yet, 
with a new section on practices and 
a stronger focus in the survey on 
preparedness and progress.
The Structure of this 
Report
Part 1 of this report explores the 
results of the Global Risks Perception 
Survey 2014. It explains the distinction 
between risks and trends, visualizes the 
likelihood of interconnections between 
risks, and analyses the difference in 
risk perceptions over different time 
horizons. Figures 1, 2 and 3 are shown 
on the inside cover flaps.
Part 2 deep-dives into three topics 
that emerged strongly from the 
interconnections between risks 
and trends: the interplay between 
geopolitics and economics, rapid 
urbanization in developing countries, 
and emerging technologies.  
 
Part 3 discusses risk management 
and risk resilience: it presents 
survey respondents’ views on which 
risks have most successfully been 
addressed over the past 10 years, 
and shares practices from the public 
and private sectors that offer ways 
forward to address global risks. The full 
methodology for the survey is shared in 
Appendix B. The complete set of data 
can be explored online at:  
www.weforum.org/risks.
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Introduction
The Global Risks 2015 report comes 
at a time when various manifestations 
of global risks brought into sharp 
relief that the world is not equipped 
to deal with these events or similar 
occurrences in the future. For the 
past decade, the Global Risks 
report has been calling attention to 
global risks and providing a base for 
multistakeholder action. Over this 
period, the evolution in understanding 
how global risks are thought about 
and assessed has been significant. 
This has led the Forum to update the 
methodology it has used to assess 
global risks for the 10th edition of 
the report, based on input from the 
members of the newly established 
Advisory Board.
Building on this evolution, in this report 
a global risk is defined as an uncertain 
event or condition that, if it occurs, 
can cause significant negative impact 
for several countries or industries 
within the next 10 years. Based on 
this refined definition, 28 global risks 
were identified and grouped into the 
five customary categories: economic 
risks, environmental risks, geopolitical 
risks, societal risks and technological 
risks. A description of the risks and the 
methodology employed can be found 
in Appendix A and Appendix B.
A further development in the 2015 
report is the delineation of risks and 
trends. This distinction allows a better 
understanding of the underlying drivers 
of global risks. A trend is defined as 
a long-term pattern that is currently 
taking place and that could contribute 
to amplifying global risks and/or altering 
the relationship between them. The 
focus on trends can contribute to risk 
mitigation; for example, better planned 
urbanization can help alleviate certain 
risks that concentrate in urban areas. 
Moreover, the differentiation between 
trends and risks emphasizes the fact 
that trends, unlike risks, are occurring 
with certainty and can have both 
positive and negative consequences. 
Trends are long-term, ongoing 
processes that can alter the future 
evolution of risks or the interrelations 
among them, without necessarily 
becoming risks themselves.
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As in previous years, risks are assessed 
based on the perception of leaders and 
decision-makers obtained through the 
Global Risks Perception Survey. The 
survey captures the views of the World 
Economic Forum’s multistakeholder 
communities across different areas 
of expertise, geographies and age 
groups. It was conducted between 
July and September 2014 and 
gathered the perceptions of almost 
900 leading decision-makers from 
business, academia and the public 
sector. A more detailed description 
of the sample and the survey’s 
methodology is presented in Appendix 
B. Complementary to the Global 
Risks Perception Survey data, the 
views of business executives were 
also collected on the risks of highest 
concern for doing business in their 
country, presented in more detail in 
Appendix C. 
The results provide a snapshot of 
current perceptions on global risks 
and highlight priorities for action from 
three complementary angles: (1) the 
Global Risks Landscape, in which risks 
are assessed according to likelihood 
and impact, allowing a comparison of 
how perceptions have evolved over the 
years (Figure 1); (2) the Interconnections 
Maps of Risks (Figure 2) and of Risks 
and Trends (Figure 3); and (3) the level 
of concern in the short and long terms 
(Figure 1.1).
The Global Risks Landscape, as 
defined by the survey, highlights five 
global risks that stand out as both 
highly likely and highly potentially 
impactful (upper right quadrant 
of Figure 1). Interstate conflict 
has significantly leaped up both 
dimensions since 2014, arguably 
reflecting recent geopolitical conflicts 
that are fuelling geopolitical and social 
instability. As last year, concerns about 
environmental and economic risks 
remain, in particular around failure of 
climate-change adaptation, water 
crises1 and unemployment and 
underemployment reflecting concern 
about how little tangible action has 
been taken to address them. At the 
same time, cyber attacks remain 
among the most likely high-impact 
risks.
Respondents also underscored the 
potentially devastating impact of 
the rapid and massive spread of 
infectious diseases, which reflects the 
need for a higher level of preparedness 
for major pandemics at both the 
country and international levels to 
address this important risk (see Box 2.4 
in Part 2).
In the geopolitical risks category, 
respondents identified weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs), which 
include weapons containing nuclear, 
chemical, biological and radiological 
technologies, as the third most 
impactful risk, albeit as the second 
least likely risk. If deployed, they would 
create an international crisis with 
huge human and economic costs. In 
the coming decades, technological 
advancements, greater access to 
scientific knowledge and the increased 
vulnerability of classified information  
to cyber threats enhance the risk  
of WMDs proliferation, particularly in 
fragile areas. This highlights the need 
for greater international collaboration to 
control the proliferation of WMDs.
Among the economic risks, fiscal 
crises and unemployment are 
perceived as close to equally impactful 
and likely as in last year’s report, 
yet other risk categories take centre 
stage this year (see Figure 1.4). While 
the world has made progress in 
addressing and preventing financial 
crises, and small improvements in fiscal 
issues and unemployment have been 
achieved, the danger of complacency 
compared to other risks exists: experts 
remain concerned about significant 
residual risks, which may have been 
overshadowed by other risks in the 
survey.2 
The prominence of risks dominating 
recent headlines in our assessments 
raises questions about the role of 
the “availability heuristic” – risks that 
have manifested themselves recently 
may be uppermost in people’s minds, 
even if their recent occurrence does 
not necessarily increase their impact 
or likelihood over a 10-year time 
horizon. To reveal more about the 
psychology behind the responses, the 
survey this year asked respondents 
to nominate risks of highest concern 
over two time horizons: 10 years, as 
usual, and 18 months. The results are 
shown in Figure 1.1. In the short term, 
respondents are more concerned 
about global risks related to recent 
events and human action, including 
interstate conflict, state collapse, 
failure of national governance and 
large-scale terrorist attacks. The 
list for the longer term is dominated 
by risks related to physical and 
environmental trends that have been 
less prominent in recent headlines, 
such as water crises, failure of climate-
change adaptation and food crises.
Interestingly, the risk of social 
instability scores high in both the 
short and long term. This trend 
towards social fragility is one of five 
threads that stand out from the 2015 
survey – along with growing concern 
about geopolitics, the possible 
overshadowing of economic risks by 
other more imminent risks, concern 
about unaddressed environmental 
risks, and persisting vulnerabilities in 
cyberspace – which are explored in 
more depth below. 
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Table 1.1.1: The Evolving Risks Landscape (2007-2015)
Breakdown of 
critical information 
infrastructure
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1st
Asset price collapse Asset price collapse Asset price collapse Fiscal crises Major systemic Major systemic 
2nd
Retrenchment 
from globalization
(developed)
Retrenchment 
from globalization 
(developed)
Retrenchment 
from globalization 
(developed)
Climate change Water supply 
crises
Water supply 
crises
3rd
Slowing Chinese 
economy (<6%)
Oil and gas 
price spike
Oil price spikes Geopolitical Food shortage 
crises imbalances
4th
Oil and gas 
price spike
Chronic disease Chronic dise e Asset price collapse
imbalances
5th
Pandemics Fiscal crises Fiscal crises Extreme energy 
price volatility
Extreme volatility in 
energy and 
agriculture prices
weapons of mass 
destruction
Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technological
Failure of climate 
change adaptation
Breakdown of 
critical information 
infrastructure
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1st
Asset price collapse Asset price collapse Asset price collapse Storms and 
cyclones
Severe income 
disparity
Severe income 
disparity
2nd
Middle East 
instability
Slowing Chinese 
economy (<6%)
Slowing Chinese 
economy (<6%)
Flooding
imbalances imbalances
3rd
Failed and failing 
states
Chronic disease Chronic disease Corruption Rising greenhouse 
gas emissions
Rising greenhouse 
gas emissions
4th
Oil and gas price 
spike
Global governance 
gaps
Fiscal crises Biodiversity loss Cyber attacks Water supply crises
5th
Chronic disease, 
developed world
Retrenchment 
from globalization 
(emerging)
Global governance 
gaps
Climate change Water supply crises Mismanagement 
of population 
ageing
2014
Fiscal crises
Climate change 
and
underemployment
Critical information 
infrastructure
2014
Income disparity
events
Unemployment 
and 
underemployment
Climate change
Cyber attacks 
Extreme weather
Water crises 
Unemployment 
breakdown
2015
Water crises
Rapid and massive
spread of infectious
diseases
Failure of
climate-change
adaptation
2015
Interstate conict
with regional
consequences
Failure of national
governance
State collapse or
crisis
High structural
unemployment or
underemployment
Extreme weather
events
Weapons of mass
destruction
Interstate conict
with regional
consequences
2007
Breakdown of
critical information
infrastructure
Chronic disease
in developed 
countries
Oil price shock
China economic 
hard landing
Asset price collapse
Top 5 Global Risks in Terms of Likelihood
Top 5 Global Risks in Terms of Impact
2007
Asset price collapse
Retrenchment 
from globalization
Interstate and
civil wars
Pandemics
Oil price shock
Source: Global Risks reports 2007-2015, World Economic Forum. 
Note: Global risks may not be strictly comparable across years, as definitions and the set of global risks have evolved with new issues emerging on the 10-year horizon. 
For example, cyber attacks, income disparity and unemployment entered the set of global risks in 2012. Some global risks were reclassified: water crises and rising 
income disparity were recategorized as societal risks and as a trend, respectively, in 2015. The 2006 edition of the Global Risks report did not have a risks landscape.
Box 1.1: The evolution of the risks of highest impact/likelihood 
As the report’s 10th anniversary approaches, the evolution of the perceived top five global risks can be viewed in terms 
of impact and likelihood as documented in the Global Risks reports from 2007 to 2015. As Table 1.1.1 shows, economic 
risks largely dominated from 2007 to 2014, with the risk of an asset-price collapse heading the list in the run-up to the 
financial crisis, giving way to concerns about the more immediate but slow-burning consequences of constrained fiscal 
finances, a major systemic financial failure in the immediate post-crisis years, and income disparity. This year features a 
radical departure from the past decade; for the first time in the report’s history, economic risks feature only marginally in 
the top five. In the 25th year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, geopolitical risks are back on the agenda. The dispute over 
Crimea in March 2014 serves as a forceful reminder of the consequences of interstate conflicts with regional 
consequences that seemed long forgotten and unfathomable, as further explored in this report. Similarly, together with 
other events in 2014, such as the prominent rise of the Islamic State, it has brought state collapse and the failure of 
national governance back into public consciousness. At the same time, health-related risks, such as pandemics – last 
considered impactful in 2008 – have made it back into the unglamorous top, following the unprecedented spread of 
Ebola.
On a higher level, Table 1.1.1 also indicates a shift over past years away from economic risks in general to environmental 
risks – ranging from climate change to water crises. While this highlights a recognition of the importance of these 
slow-burning issues, strikingly little progress has been made to address them in light of their far-reaching and 
detrimental consequences for this and future generations.
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Figure 1.1: Global Risks of Highest Concern - for the Next 18 Months and 10 Years
Water crises
Profound social instability
Large-scale involuntary
migration
Failure of urban planning
Unemployment or
underemployment
Fiscal crises
Asset bubble
Failure of financial mechanism
or institution
Energy price shock
Deflation
Unmanageable inflation
Interstate conflict
State collapse or crisis
Terrorist attacks
Weapons of mass destruction
Failure of national governance
47.2%
19.2%
33.5%40.3%
23.3%
21.0%
18 months 10 yearsGeopolitical risks 18 months 10 yearsSocietal risks 18 months 10 yearsEconomic risks
Extreme weather events
Failure of climate-change
adaptation
Natural catastrophes
Biodiversity loss and
ecosystem collapse
Man-made environmental
catastrophes
33.1%
21.5%
18 months 10 yearsEnvironmental risks
Cyber attacks
Data fraud or theft
Critical information
infrastructure breakdown
Misuse of technologies
18 months 10 yearsTechnological risks
Area corresponds to
% of respondents
mentioning the risk
to be of high concern
on an 18-month time frame
Area corresponds to 
% of respondents
mentioning the risk
to be of high concern
on a 10-year time frame
Spread of infectious diseases
Food crises
Failure of critical infrastructure
23.3% 20.2%
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2014, World Economic Forum. 
Note: Survey respondents were asked to select up to five risks of highest concern for each time frame. The percentage indicates the share of respondents who selected the 
specific global risk among the five risks of highest concern for each time frame.  In each category, the risks are sorted by the total sum of mentions. See Appendix B for more 
details. To ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are abbreviated. See Appendix A for the full name and description.
Fragile Societies under 
Pressure 
The fragility of societies is of increasing 
concern, fuelled by underlying 
economic, societal and environmental 
developments (Figure 3 and Figure 
1.2). A major driver of social fragility is 
rising socio-economic inequality 
within countries, although it is 
diminishing between countries. Among 
the members of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the average 
income of the richest 10% has now 
grown to about nine times that of the 
poorest 10%. In other countries, the 
ratio is even higher: for example, more 
than 25 times in Mexico.3 
Income inequality is widening quickly 
in large emerging markets. The 
People’s Republic of China has seen 
its Gini Index rise from about 30 in 
the 1980s to over 50 in 2010.4,5 While 
extreme poverty (less than $1.25 per 
day) was reduced from afflicting over 
50% of the world’s population in 1990 
to 22% in 2010, the same reduction 
did not take place in those earning 
under $3 per day.6 The story is of 
people escaping extreme poverty, 
yet remaining poor. Widening income 
inequality is associated with lower and 
more fragile economic growth, which 
reduces the scope to meet rising social 
expectations in emerging markets.7
 
Rising structural unemployment 
drives both inequality and social 
pressures. Lower economic growth 
and technological change are likely 
to keep unemployment high in the 
future, also in developing countries. 
The spread of connectivity enables 
protest movements to mount more 
quickly, increasing the risk of unrest 
and violence that could easily spill 
over from individual countries to affect 
the global economy. While inequality 
and unemployment contribute to 
social instability, social instability in 
turn impacts negatively on equality, 
employment and wealth creation. 
The multidirectional cause-and-effect 
relationship makes it harder to address 
the related risks.
Underlying social fragility is also the 
accelerating pace of change, growing 
complexity and the deepening extent 
of global interdependence, which 
together reduce people’s feeling 
of control over their immediate 
environment and hence their sense 
of stability and security. A common 
psychological response to insecurity 
and perceived loss of control is the 
desire to turn inwards towards smaller 
groups that have a stronger sense of 
identity. At the same time, increased 
global connectivity allows people 
to make their voices heard and to 
convene with like-minded individuals. 
The growing risks of social extremism 
and isolationism are brought to 
light through the rising influence of 
religious groups and in the separatist 
movements in Catalonia and Scotland.
The effects associated with climate 
change will put further pressure on 
societies. Its expected impact on 
the ability to grow food and access 
water could prompt sudden and 
uncontrolled population migrations, 
putting additional pressure on 
receiving countries.8 Already in 2014, 
the number of refugees worldwide 
from environmental or conflict-related 
causes reached its highest level since 
World War II.9
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As societies become less homogenous 
and less bound by common values, 
and more polarized into the haves and 
have-nots, they will become harder to 
govern effectively. This in turn increases 
the risk of prolonged economic 
stagnation, creating the potential for 
a self-reinforcing downward spiral 
into social chaos. States will need to 
mitigate this risk through policies to 
make growth more inclusive: providing 
public goods and services such as 
social protection, hospitals, schools, 
transport and telecommunications 
infrastructure.  
Growing Worries about 
Conflict
Having not featured prominently 
in previous editions of the report, 
interstate conflict is this year 
considered the most likely high-impact 
risk over the next 10 years, or indeed 
perhaps even sooner. As already 
discussed, respondents are even more 
concerned about geopolitical risks in 
the short term than in the long term 
(Figure 1.1) 
Many observers believe that the world 
is entering a new era of strategic 
competition among global powers. 
Disillusion about globalization is leading 
to more self-interested foreign policies 
in combination with a rise in national 
sentiment (Figure 3) fuelled in part by 
the social pressures described above. 
Growing nationalism is evident around 
the world: in Russia, as seen in the 
Crimea crisis; in India, with the rising 
popularity of nationalist politicians; 
and in Europe, with the rise of far-right, 
nationalistic and Eurosceptic parties in 
a number of countries.
Growth and employment creation are 
currently expected to remain below 
pre-crisis levels in both emerging 
markets and advanced economies, 
suggesting that the drivers of 
nationalism will remain strong, and 
raising the possibility of more frequent 
and impactful conflicts among states. 
Importantly, as can be seen in Figure 2, 
interstate conflict is no longer physical 
but uses economic means and cyber 
warfare to attack people’s privacy as 
well as intangible assets. 
Geopolitical risks can have cascading 
impacts on other risks. As state 
structures are challenged by conflict, 
the risk of the failure of national 
governance and state collapse or crisis 
can increase in areas where current 
state boundaries do not necessarily 
reflect popular self-identification. A 
recent example is Iraq and Syria, 
where ISIS has claimed control of 
territory and attracted 20,000 to 
30,000 fighters from a near standing 
start.10 The rapid rise and brutality of 
ISIS as well as the response of the 
international community may underlie 
the increased likelihood and impact 
attributed by respondents to the 
risk of the deployment of weapons 
Figure 1.2: The Changing Global Risks 
Landscape 2014-2015, Societal Risks
Source: Global Risks Perception Surveys 2013 and 
2014, World Economic Forum. 
Note: See endnote 25
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of mass destruction and the higher 
potential impact than in previous years 
associated with large-scale terrorist 
attacks (Figure 1.3). 
Failure of national governance features 
strongly this year, as the third most 
likely risk across the global risks 
landscape. This risk area captures a 
number of important elements around 
the inability to efficiently govern as 
a result of corruption, illicit trade, 
organized crime, the presence of 
impunity and generally weak rule of 
law. Over past years, the links between 
many forms of global crime and 
corruption and their impact on global 
security, extremism, terrorism and 
fragile states have only grown stronger, 
and it is critical to acknowledge and 
address them through more effective 
policies that curb illegal financial 
flows, foster transparent governance 
and build capacity around anti-crime 
efforts at the national and local levels. 
Absent a stronger response from both 
the public and private sectors, the risk 
is of undoing hard-earned gains in 
economic and political stability, and 
further eroding trust in leadership. 
In a number of countries, such as 
India, Indonesia and Romania, new 
leaders have been elected in large 
part due to their public commitment to 
more transparent and corruption-free 
governance models, underscoring an 
ongoing shift in public expectations.
The growing interconnectedness of 
the global economy increases the 
economic effects of any geopolitical 
conflict. Supply chains that run 
across countries in conflict could be 
interrupted, leading to disruptions in 
the availability of goods or energy. 
Survey respondents considered the 
risk of an energy price shock to the 
global economy as more impactful 
and more likely than in previous years, 
despite the increasing availability of 
shale gas or alternative energy sources. 
The interplay between economic and 
geopolitical forces is further explored in 
Part 2 of this report. 
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Figure 1.3: The Changing Global Risks 
Landscape 2014-2015, Geopolitical 
Risks
Rising nationalist sentiment and 
declining trust among global players 
are contributing to a weakening 
of international governance, 
undermining the international 
community’s ability to act decisively 
on issues such as conflict resolution, 
Internet governance, climate change 
and the management of oceans. 
Failure to collaborate and implement 
common solutions in these areas could 
significantly undermine future global 
growth.
Box 1.2: The rising threat from non-state actors 
The group known as ISIS, ISIL or the Islamic State has gained global notoriety 
through its taste for video-recorded executions and large-scale atrocity, with a 
background of further human rights abuse that includes arbitrary 
imprisonment and sexual enslavement. While its thirst for violence, blood and 
misery – and especially the way it glories in these crimes – mark it out from 
other non-state armed forces of our age, this is really only a quantitative 
distinction. Other groups – many of them part of the global Al Qaeda franchise 
– do the same, only less. Al Nusra in Syria, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
and the Nigerian group known in the West as Boko Haram all do some of what 
ISIS does on a somewhat smaller scale.
But what really marks ISIS out is that it has claimed statehood and with that 
has established some of the machinery of state management. ISIS has not 
only proclaimed the new Caliphate, the rule of the successors of the Prophet 
Muhammad – not that it has any theological credibility to do so – but also 
administers the area of northern Iraq and eastern Syria where it holds sway. It 
handles law and order, some social services on a selective basis, and has an 
intelligence service and system of informers set up for it by former officials of 
the overthrown Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein. Adding to the lavish 
funds it has raised from the Gulf region, it has also taken over and emptied the 
central bank in Mosul, making it the richest non-state armed force in the world 
and equipping it to be a non-state state.
The phenomenon is not without precedent: the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government in South Vietnam did much the same in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, without the self-glorification of atrocity and terror. And it is not without 
parallel today. The Taliban have effective control over parts of Afghanistan and 
was effectively the state in the late 1990s, until the US-led offensive overthrew 
it in October 2001. Among other examples, for a long time FARC has been in 
control of large areas of Colombia, while the Seleka militia is in charge of 
northern areas of Central African Republic. Having withdrawn from Bangui in 
January 2014 under heavy international pressure, they are recuperating by 
systematically taxing gold and diamond mining, livestock and other economic 
activities – behaving in part like a nascent state. Some groups have not based 
themselves outside the territory over which they are fighting, but have waged 
warfare that is not territorially limited. In the Al Qaeda mode, they have fought 
what they perceive to be a global enemy. Today, perhaps the trend is in the 
opposite direction: re-entry into an era of the non-state state.
Source: Global Risks Perception Surveys 2013 and 
2014, World Economic Forum. 
Note: See endnote 25
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Economic Risks: Out of 
the Spotlight?
The global economy is returning to 
growth, albeit sluggishly, and there is 
a feeling that significant progress has 
been made in reducing the likelihood of 
another financial crisis (as explored in 
Box 1.4). This may reflect a false sense 
of control, as history shows that people 
do not always learn from past failures 
and are often taken by surprise by the 
same risks.
The global unemployment rate is 
expected to remain at current levels 
until 2018, reflecting a growing 
problem of structural unemployment 
in advanced economies.11 This will 
likely keep wages low, maintaining 
deflationary pressures; in the Eurozone, 
inflation fell as low as 0.66% in 2014. 
As past years have seen a build-up 
of debt in many major economies – 
notably China, where the corporate 
debt-to-GDP ratio went from 92% 
in 2003-2007 to 110% in 2013 – the 
possible risk is that deflation could 
reduce debtors’ ability to repay, 
threatening the future stability of the 
financial system.12  
Conversely, low interest rates have 
also fuelled the risk of asset bubbles. 
Since the financial crisis, the use of 
expansionary monetary policy – such 
as quantitative easing and zero interest 
rates – has not had the expected 
impact of significantly increasing credit 
availability in the real economy, instead 
leading to a reflation of asset prices. 
Credit booms and asset bubbles have 
historically resulted in bank bailouts 
and recession in the real economy (see 
Box 1.3). 
The risks of a failure of a major 
financial mechanism or institution 
and fiscal crises are perceived as 
equally impactful and likely as in last 
year’s report (Figure 1.4), yet other risks, 
such as water crises, interstate conflict 
and the failure of climate-change 
adaptation, have taken centre stage. 
This runs the risk of diverting decision-
makers’ attention away from continuing 
economic reforms. Despite recent 
efforts (see Box 1.4), either deflationary 
pressures or the bursting of an asset-
price bubble could still cause the failure 
of a major financial mechanism or 
Figure 1.4: The Changing Global Risks 
Landscape 2014-2015, Economic Risks
institution – especially as the shadow 
banking sector is less regulated yet 
increasingly important.13 Likewise, in 
many countries public debt levels are 
still worryingly high so that the related 
risks are likely to persist over many 
years.
Decision-makers’ focus on other 
risks could lead to inaction at a time 
when continued progress in structural 
reform is most necessary; The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 
outlines some priorities.14 Maintaining 
the momentum of both financial and 
fiscal reforms will be crucial to avoid 
another major economic crisis.
Box 1.3: Asset bubbles – a new old risk? 
The evidence of frothiness is increasing in a number of housing markets in 
both advanced and emerging economies – including Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Sweden, Norway, China, Hong Kong SAR and 
Singapore – as well as in a number of credit and equity markets across the 
world.
The traditional goal of central banks has been economic stability: keeping 
inflation low while achieving robust growth. The current realization is that 
central banks must also seek to preserve financial stability – which means, 
among other things, avoiding risky bubbles. The current theory is that macro-
prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system will avoid bubbles 
and achieve financial stability. However, bubbles are very hard to identify (price 
increases could also reflect market movements), and macro-prudential 
regulation has not historically been effective and excludes the unregulated 
shadow banking system.
If macro-prudential regulation fails again, central banks will be left with only 
one tool – monetary policy – to pursue both goals of economic and financial 
stability. This may prove impossible. Trying to prick bubbles by using monetary 
policy risks causing a bond market rout and a hard landing for the real 
economy. However, keeping monetary policy loose in a bid to help the real 
economy risks inflating asset bubbles that will, inevitably, eventually burst and 
also damage the real economy. Loose monetary policy is the mother of all 
bubbles. Attempting to walk this tightrope will be a difficult issue for central 
banks in both advanced and emerging markets in the years to come.
Source: Global Risks Perception Surveys 2013 and 
2014, World Economic Forum. 
Note: See endnote 25
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Box 1.4: Recent advances in the global regulation of the financial system
The global financial system is undergoing massive structural change as a result not only of the crisis but of the regulatory 
changes in its wake. The very fact that the whole post-crisis regulatory overhaul has been spearheaded by the Financial 
Stability Board and G20, i.e. with explicit political backing by a global set of policy-makers, is very innovative and has not 
been the case in setting international regulatory standards before. The past five years have witnessed a profound change 
of international regulatory standards for banks and non-banks alike. 
♦ Banks’ regulatory rules have been revised (usually subsumed under the Basel III heading), resulting in stronger capital 
requirements, the first-ever globally agreed liquidity standards (for a short-term liquidity and a structural funding 
measure), and new standards for constraining large exposures and improving risk management. Also, supervisory 
standards are being raised and the international standard setter (Basel Committee) has launched a programme to 
assess national implementation, which exerts peer pressure on jurisdictions to implement the reforms in a consistent 
manner.
♦ Cross-border resolution difficulties witnessed in the crisis are reflected in the new set of expectations with regard to 
effective resolution regimes and a process of recovery and resolution planning for the largest banks, complete with 
setting up cross-border crisis management groups composed of authorities from the (most prominent) jurisdictions 
where these banks operate.
♦ Regarding non-banks, the international community is finalizing a basic solvency requirement for global insurers who 
are systemically important – to date there has been no global solvency standard; over-the-counter derivatives 
markets are undergoing major overhaul with measures aimed at mandating and/or incentivizing central clearing and 
trading on organized platforms with reporting to trade repositories of all contracts. In terms of insurance regulation, 
many countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia are adopting variants of the Solvency II regime. New insurance 
regulation has a strong emphasis on corporate governance, disclosure and accountability. These measures are 
relevant as they aim to change the broader corporate behaviour.
♦ International accounting standards are being changed, in particular to make loss recognition more forward-looking 
(newly issued IFRS9).
♦ Some supervisory authority over the financial sector has been relocated to central banks, most notably in Europe, 
where the European Central Bank has taken on additional responsibilities.
Still, of course, challenges remain. Addressing the issue of “too-big-to-fail” remains a key issue. Efforts are needed to: (i) 
finalize living wills and identify and remove barriers to firms’ resolvability; (ii) reach consensus on banks’ loss-absorbing 
capacity to ensure that they can be resolved; (iii) address obstacles to cross-border cooperation and recognition of 
resolution measures; (iv) ensure recovery and resolution of non-banks; and (v) promote better regulation of the shadow 
banking sector. Cross-border challenges persist also in over-the-counter derivatives reform. As regulatory regimes 
developed in parallel in the two largest markets (European Union and United States), they resulted in a framework that 
overlaps and is not completely consistent. Regulatory decisions allowing reliance on home regulatory regimes (known as 
“deference”) are urgently needed. Trade reporting requirements have been adopted in key countries but legal barriers 
frustrate implementation. Progress on trading standardized contracts on exchanges and electronic trading platforms 
continues to slip. Political commitment is needed to advance reforms in all these areas. 
Source: This box draws on the latest Global Financial Stability Report and related IMF work. 
Note: In addition to the current regulatory reforms described above, some experts believe that profound changes in the corporate culture and incentive systems in the 
financial sector are needed to reduce excessive risk-taking.
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Box 1.5: Black Sky – risks to critical infrastructure 
The world has more to lose than ever before from massive failure of critical 
infrastructure. To improve efficiency and lower cost, various systems have 
been allowed to become hyperdependent on one another. The failure of one 
weak link – whether from natural disaster, human error or terrorism – can 
create ripple effects across multiple systems and over wide geographical 
areas. 
Large-scale power outages might be the most visible illustration. The initiating 
event in the August 2003 power failures in the United States occurred in Ohio 
but the worst consequences were felt by 55 million people in the north-eastern 
part of the United States and Canada. The July 2012 India blackout was the 
largest in history, affecting 670 million people, about 10% of the world 
population, and was partially triggered by high demand during a heat wave.
In many countries, infrastructure has not been maintained well enough to 
withstand the kinds of catastrophes that could spark such cascading effects. 
This is often the result of procrastination, the perception that the risk is so 
small that it is not worth considering or crowding out by other priorities, and 
the fact that investing in preparedness is rarely immediately rewarded in the 
electoral process. The challenge is financial, and incentives are misaligned. For 
example, in the United States, over 80% of infrastructure is owned or 
managed by private sector firms, which are not responsible for the negative 
externalities that failure of their part of the infrastructure could have  
elsewhere.1 To increase investment in infrastructure, a coordinated, global, 
long-term and multistakeholder approach is required. Upgrading infrastructure 
is essential, in recognition that resilient infrastructure has become the 
backbone of a competitive economy. 
Note:  
1 Auerswald, Branscomb, LaPorte and Michel-Kerjan, 2006.
Environment – High 
Concern, Little Progress
Over the past decade, awareness has 
grown regarding the threats posed 
by environmental change to social, 
political and economic security. As the 
Global Risks Perception Survey 2014 
highlights, three of the top 10 risks in 
terms of impact over the next 10 years 
are environmental risks: water crises, 
at the top of the table, and failure of 
climate-change adaptation as well as 
biodiversity loss (see Figure 1).15 
Figure 1.5: The Changing Global Risks 
Landscape 2014-2015, Environmental 
Risks
Both water crises and failure of 
climate-change adaptation are also 
perceived as more likely and impactful 
than average (upper right quadrant 
of Figure 1 and Figure 1.5). Global 
water requirements are projected to 
be pushed beyond sustainable water 
supplies by 40% by 2030.16 Agriculture 
already accounts for on average 
70% of total water consumption and, 
according to the World Bank, food 
production will need to increase by 
50% by 2030 as the population grows 
and dietary habits change.17,18 The 
International Energy Agency further 
projects water consumption to meet 
the needs of energy generation and 
production to increase by 85% by 
2035.19
Source: Global Risks Perception Surveys 2013 and 
2014, World Economic Forum. 
Note: See endnote 25
Natural
catastrophesMan-made 
environmental
catastrophes
Extreme
weather
events
Biodiversity loss 
and ecosystem collapse
Failure of 
climate change 
adaptation
Environmental Risks 2014 2015
Im
pa
ct
Likelihood
4.0
5.0
4.0 5.0
21Global Risks 2015
P
art 1
P
art 2
P
art 3
The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change notes that weather 
extremes in food-producing regions 
are already causing price increases 
and suggests that the impact of climate 
change on weather patterns and rainfall 
– causing either floods or droughts – 
could cut crop yields by up to 25%.20
The nexus of food, water, energy and 
climate change has been identified by 
the US National Intelligence Council as 
one of four overarching mega trends 
that will shape the world in 2030.21 The 
risks interconnections map (see Figure 
2) shows how survey respondents 
perceived this nexus to be related also 
to other risks, including large-scale 
involuntary migration.
Decision-makers will be forced to 
make tough choices about allocations 
of water that will impact users across 
the economy (Part 3 of this report 
highlights an approach developed in 
Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin, for 
addressing this issue). The situation 
will worsen further if more man-made 
environmental catastrophes causing 
shocks to the system happen: more 
recent examples include the Fukushima 
power plant disaster threatening to 
contaminate both freshwater and 
seawater, or the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill contaminating large sections of 
coast along the Gulf of Mexico.
Overfishing, deforestation and the 
inadequate management of sensitive 
ecosystems such as coral reefs are 
increasing the stress on food and water 
systems. Major biodiversity loss and 
ecosystem collapse was assessed 
as high impact by respondents, but 
below average in terms of likelihood 
(see Figure 1); the latter seems to reflect 
a misperception. The World Bank 
estimates that 75% of the world’s poor, 
or 870 million people, make a living 
from ecosystems, including tourism 
and the goods they produce, while 350 
million are affected by the loss of coral 
reefs.22 Increasingly, decision-makers 
are realizing that biodiversity loss is not 
a second-order issue but is intricately 
linked to economic development, food 
challenges and water security.
The urgency of coordinated global 
action on climate change was 
reinforced in April and November 
2014 by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change’s release of its 
Fifth Assessment Report and the 
associated update. It reconfirms that 
warming is unequivocally happening 
and it is “extremely likely” that human 
influence has been the dominant 
cause. Atmospheric concentrations 
of three major greenhouse gases 
(carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous 
oxide) are at their highest level in 
800,000 years. Strong evidence of the 
effects of climate change is already 
apparent, in terms of sea level rise, 
shrinking glaciers, warmer oceans and 
the increasing frequency of weather 
extremes.
Even though all of these risks are 
well known, governments and 
businesses often remain woefully 
underprepared, as illustrated by 
respondents’ perceptions that relatively 
little progress has been made on 
these risks in the last decade (see 
Figure 3.1). At the heart of the problem 
is a risk-management approach 
based on responsive measures that 
assume things go back to normal 
after a crisis – an approach that falls 
short with complex or slowly evolving 
environmental risks such as climate 
change. Stakeholders have been slow 
to address the underlying causes 
of environmental risks or to address 
their economic, social, political and 
humanitarian consequences. 
Box 1.6: The road to Paris – is 2015 make or break for climate 
change? 
In 2015 the international community has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to 
align the climate change and development agenda. A series of global summits on 
climate change, disaster risk reduction, financing for development and sustainable 
development goals could embed into the post-2015 global governance 
architecture a coherent agenda for tackling interlocking environmental risks.
Convergence among governments on these decisions could kick-start the next 
generation of sustainable growth and poverty reduction – through catalysing 
private finance and scaling low-carbon, climate-resilient investment, especially but 
not only in developing countries. However, the opportunity will be missed if 
governments continue to value narrow short-term concerns above the prospect of 
longer-term global prosperity and environmental security. More vulnerable 
populations will be consigned to the negative spiral of poverty and environmental 
degradation.
Until recently, the expectation was that governments would struggle to finalize a 
strong global climate accord in time for the Paris climate conference in December 
2015. But is the tide beginning to turn? At the United Nations Secretary-General’s 
Climate Summit in September 2014, over 1,000 businesses and investors signalled 
their support for global carbon pricing. So did some 73 countries, covering 52% of 
global GDP and 54% of global emissions.
Major consumer companies and financial institutions see the need to reduce global 
climate risks and have mobilized action along their supply chains, for example 
through the New York Declaration on Forests and the move towards climate-
friendly coolants. The Oil & Gas Climate Initiative signalled refreshed engagement 
from major energy producers.
The hope is that these coalitions of committed businesses could both inject 
concrete solutions and create a more positive global atmosphere for governments 
to collectively make decisions in 2015. A positive signal is the agreement between 
China and the United States in November 2014. A strong set of clear policy signals 
to the wider business community is needed from the world’s governments on their 
ambition to tackle environmental risks. The year 2015 is not an opportunity the 
world can afford to miss.
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Technological Risks: Back 
to the Future
The risk of large-scale cyber attacks 
continues to be considered above 
average on both dimensions of impact 
and likelihood (see Figures 1 and 
1.6) This reflects both the growing 
sophistication of cyber attacks and 
the rise of hyperconnectivity, with 
a growing number of physical objects 
connected to the Internet and more 
and more sensitive personal data – 
including about health and finances 
– being stored by companies in the 
cloud. In the United States alone, cyber 
crime already costs an estimated $100 
billion each year.23 
Figure 1.6: The Changing Global Risks 
Landscape 2014-2015, Technological 
Risks
The IoT is likely to disrupt business 
models and ecosystems across a 
range of industries. While this will 
deliver innovation, the prospect of 
many large players across multiple 
industries being forced to change 
so radically at the same time raises 
potential systemic risks such as large-
scale disruption in labour markets 
and volatility in financial markets. A 
major public security failure could also 
prevent the IoT from becoming truly 
widespread. 
An important characteristic of global 
risks, which transpires across the 
cases included in this report, is their 
Box 1.7: Governing the Internet — the need for mechanisms to 
maintain a unified and resilient network 
The pace of innovation and the highly distributed nature of the Internet require a 
new approach to global Internet governance and cooperation. As more people 
rely on the Internet, the question of Internet governance becomes increasingly 
important. Two kinds of issues exist: technical matters, to make sure all the 
infrastructure and devices that constitute the Internet can talk to each other; and 
overarching matters, to address cyber crime, Net neutrality, privacy and freedom 
of expression.
Responsibility for the technical infrastructure of the Internet is dispersed among 
several organizations, including the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), the 
root servers’ operators, and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN). The solutions they propose – policy models, standards, 
specifications or best practices – spread through voluntary adoption or ad hoc 
conventions, regulations, directives, contracts or other agreements.
No such systems exist for developing and implementing solutions to the 
overarching issues. Consequently, governments are feeling pressure to enact 
national measures to deal with their citizens’ data and privacy concerns. While 
laws that force the “localization” of infrastructure may be easier short-term 
solutions than collaborating to define global mechanisms for addressing the 
issues, the risk is that “data nationalism” could endanger the network effects that 
underlie the Internet’s ability to drive innovation and create social and economic 
value. 
To advance the conversation, identify possible solutions and contribute to open, 
resilient and inclusive Internet governance, the World Economic Forum is 
embarking on a multiyear strategic initiative to bring together leaders from the 
public and private sectors with civil society leaders and the technical community 
to address these issues in an impartial, high-level dialogue. This effort will 
complement the expert-level discussions taking place at the Internet Governance 
Forum and various other grassroots and government-led initiatives.
interconnectedness, shown in the 
Interconnections Map in Figure 2. It is 
important to stress that risks cannot 
be seen in isolation. The feedback 
loops between risks and the fact that 
they are also driven by underlying 
trends (Figure 3) raise their complexity 
and make it more difficult to control 
individual risks. Over past years, the 
speed of transmission and the strength 
of interconnections have increased. 
The complexity of addressing risks, 
their likelihood and their potential 
consequences raise the question of 
preparedness, on the global, regional, 
national and local levels.
Source: Global Risks Perception Surveys 2013 and 
2014, World Economic Forum. 
Note: See endnote 25
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While the “Internet of Things” (IoT) will 
deliver innovations, it will also entail new 
risks. Analytics on large and disparate 
data sources can drive breakthrough 
insights but also raise questions about 
expectations of privacy and the fair 
and appropriate use of data about 
individuals. Security risks are also 
intensified. There are more devices to 
secure against hackers, and bigger 
downsides from failure: hacking the 
location data on a car is merely an 
invasion of privacy, whereas hacking 
the control system of a car would be 
a threat to life. The current Internet 
infrastructure was not developed with 
such security concerns in mind.
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Preparedness at the 
Regional Level Is Different
As most efforts to address global risks 
are undertaken at the national and 
regional levels, it is important to look 
at preparedness from a disaggregated 
perspective. Figure 1.7 illustrates 
for each world region those risks for 
which survey respondents indicated 
their region is the least prepared. 
Preparedness reflects a combination 
of exposure to a risk and the measures 
that have already been taken to 
mitigate or prepare for it.
It is striking that every region presents a 
wholly different set of issues for which it 
is least prepared. For example:
♦ High structural unemployment 
or underemployment is seen 
as the risk for which Europe is 
least prepared, followed by large-
scale involuntary migration and 
profound social instability. Both 
unemployment and migration flows 
into Europe are expected to remain 
high on the agenda going forward 
and are driving factors of social 
instability.24 
♦ North America identifies failure/
shortfall of critical infrastructure, 
large-scale cyber attacks and failure 
of climate-change adaptation as 
the three risks for which it is least 
prepared. Major breakdowns 
of infrastructure in the wake of 
Superstorm Sandy and the sheer 
number of cyber attacks illustrate 
the low level of preparedness.
♦ Sub-Saharan Africa is considered 
least prepared for infectious 
diseases and unemployment. Both 
are of key importance given recent 
events and the fact that strong 
population growth is expected to 
exacerbate unemployment in the 
coming years, despite expected 
economic growth.
♦ Many regions, including Europe, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and the Middle East and North 
Africa, also include profound social 
instability among the risks they are 
least prepared for.
♦ East Asia and the Pacific is 
perceived as least prepared for 
interstate conflict and failure of 
urban planning. It is also the 
only region that reported being 
least prepared for man-made 
environmental catastrophes 
following the 2011 Fukushima 
incidence.
♦ Failure of urban planning is among 
the first three risks in East Asia and 
the Pacific, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and South Asia. 
In such regions, urbanization is 
especially rapid and the failure of 
urban planning can lead to a wide 
range of catastrophic scenarios 
from social unrest to pandemic 
outbreak (Part 2).
Figure 1.7: For Which Global Risks Is Your Region Least Prepared?
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2014, World Economic Forum.
Note: Respondents were asked to select three global risks that they believe their region is least prepared for. For legibility reasons, the names of the global risks are 
abbreviated. Please see Appendix A for the full name and description. Oceania is not displayed because of the low number of respondents.
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Conclusion
Drawing on the perceptions of almost 
900 survey respondents, this chapter 
focuses on the threats of social fragility 
and short-term worries about conflict. 
Rising socio-economic inequality, weak 
economic growth, food price volatility 
and food insecurity, unemployment, 
large-scale migration and the growing 
heterogeneity and interdependence 
of societies are among the key 
drivers of social fragility. Growing 
social polarization, isolationism and 
nationalism in turn have the potential to 
trigger geopolitical conflicts.
The section highlights the 
interconnections between global risks 
and trends. A better understanding of 
global risks and the interconnections 
between them is key to prompting 
discussion about how to prepare, 
mitigate and prevent them. Part 2 of 
this report analyses in detail selected 
clusters of interconnected risks and 
how they could evolve – the interplay 
between geopolitical and economic 
risks, challenges related to urbanization 
in developing countries and emerging 
technologies.
Endnotes
1 The risk of water crises is classified as a societal risk for the purpose of this report. However, it has an important 
environmental dimension. 
2 IMF, 2014a.
3 OECD, 2011.
4 Standardized World Income Inequality Database. See http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html.
5 The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution on a scale from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality). 
6 UN, 2014. 
7 Berg and Ostry, 2011. And Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides, 2014.
8 IPCC, 2014, pp. 1-32.
9 UNHCR, 2014.
10 “Islamic State fighter estimate triples – CIA”, BBC, 12 September 2014; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-29169914.
11 ILO, 2014.
12 IMF, 2014b.
13 IMF, 2014c.
14 World Economic Forum, 2014.
15 As mentioned above, the risk of water crises is classified as a societal risk for the purpose of this report. However, it 
has an important environmental dimension.
16 2030 Water Resources Group, 2009.
17 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, aquastat; http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/water_
use/index.stm.
18 World Bank, Food Security; http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/foodsecurity/overview#1.
19 IEA, 2012.
20 Porter et al., 2014.
21 NIC, 2012.
22 World Bank, Biodiversity; http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/biodiversity/overview.
23 See The Wall Street Journal, “Annual U.S. Cybercrime Costs Estimated at $100 Billion”, 22 July 2013; http://online.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324328904578621880966242990.
24 In the first nine months of 2014, the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe reached 
160,000, twice the previous record from 2011. Integrating such a large number of migrants is a big challenge, which 
has the potential to destabilize societies if not properly addressed.
25 Global risks may not be strictly comparable across years, as the names and description of the risks were revised 
between 2014 and 2015. The risks introduced in 2015 are not displayed in the figures and only the risks for which the 
name or the description were slightly revised between 2014 and 2015 are presented. Water crises was categorized 
as an environmental risk in 2014 but as a societal risk in 2015. To ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are 
abbreviated. Please see Appendix A for the full name and description.
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Part 2:  
Risks in Focus
2.1 Introduction
This section of the Global Risks 2015 
report presents deep-dives into 
three “risks in focus” – the interplay 
between geopolitics and economics, 
rapid and unplanned urbanization in 
developing countries, and emerging 
technologies – that emerged from the 
Risks Interconnections Map and the 
Risks-Trends Interconnections Map (see 
Figures 2 and 3). These provide good 
illustrations of the links between different 
global risks. The analysis in the following 
pages is based on follow-up research 
and interviews with experts.
As discussed in Part 1, geopolitical risks 
are back, as evident from the central 
node of the failure of national governance 
in the interconnections maps, and the 
strong linkages to interstate conflict 
and profound social instability, among 
others. With economies tied together 
on an unprecedented scale by financial 
and trade flows, many analysts are 
concerned about the resurgence of the 
trend towards the interplay between 
geopolitics and economics. While 
national governments in the past 
also made use of economic tools to 
increase their relative power, today’s 
strong economic ties arguably make 
this interplay more complex and 
therefore more difficult to navigate. 
This resurgence could have profound 
implications for the effectiveness of 
global governance mechanisms in other 
areas, from combating climate change 
to reaching an international solution for 
Internet governance. 
Even as nation states step up their 
efforts to maintain or expand power, 
urbanization is slowly but surely 
rebalancing the locus of power from 
national to city governments. The 
data gathered for this report suggest 
that urbanization is a critical driver 
of profound social instability, failure 
of critical infrastructure, water crises, 
and the spread of infectious diseases 
(see Figure 3). This will only be further 
exacerbated by an unprecedented 
transition from rural to urban areas: 
by 2050, two-thirds of the world’s 
population – an estimated 6.3 billion 
people – will live in cities, with 80% in 
less developed regions.1 Rapid and 
unplanned urbanization in these regions 
has the potential to drive many risks. 
How effectively the world addresses 
global risks, ranging from climate 
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change to pandemics, will increasingly 
be determined by how well cities are 
governed. The concentration of a 
large number of people, assets, critical 
infrastructure and economic activities 
means that the risks materializing at the 
city level have the potential to disrupt 
society.
From artificial intelligence to synthetic 
biology, the need for governance on 
a global scale comes into focus when 
considering emerging technologies, 
given the many uncertainties about how 
emerging technologies evolve and their 
far-reaching economic, societal and 
environmental implications. The data 
also point to strong interconnections 
with man-made and natural 
environmental catastrophes (see Figure 
2). The coming years are likely to see 
rapid advances in such fields as artificial 
intelligence and synthetic biology – and 
while many of their impacts are likely to 
be beneficial, negative effects will spread 
quickly in today’s hyperconnected world. 
Some of those negative effects may 
be difficult to anticipate and safeguard 
against.
In many cases, by addressing the 
trends underlying most of the risks, the 
vulnerability to risks can be reduced 
significantly. In addition, understanding 
the context and possible trajectories of a 
significant nexus of risks and trends can 
help to clarify ways to address them and 
to capitalize on opportunities presented 
by the trends. That is the aim of the 
analysis that follows. 
 
2.2 Global Risks Arising 
from the Accelerated 
Interplay between 
Geopolitics and 
Economics
Geopolitics traditionally focuses 
on military might, resources and 
demographics as measures of national 
influence, while economics focuses on 
growth, productivity and prosperity. 
However, geopolitics and economics 
have been intertwined through history – 
for example in the rise of British political 
power on the back of the “economic” 
Industrial Revolution, the era of British 
and French colonialism, or the Cold 
War, when a deep geopolitical divide 
separated economies. When the Cold 
War ended, an era of common norms 
ushered in a global economy; now, 
more than 25 years after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, strategic competition is 
returning. The world is grappling with 
a seemingly accelerating dynamic 
between geopolitics and economics. 
Today’s realpolitik is not ideologically 
driven, includes new players and takes 
place in the context of deep economic 
integration.
Will the global economy, the efficiency of 
the international system and the win-
win logic of commerce be undermined 
by geopolitics? How will economic 
decisions and spheres of influence 
impact the global balance of power? 
What global risks could emerge when 
countries use economic rather than 
military tools to advance their ends? 
These questions have been brought 
into focus by trends including the 
recent heightened tensions in East 
Asia, the acceleration of regional 
integration in South-East Asia and the 
rise of preferential and regional trade 
agreements more generally, the shale 
gas and oil revolution in the United 
States, turbulence in the Middle East 
and Ukraine, competing integration 
mechanisms in Latin America, China’s 
assertion of leadership in the global 
economy, and acts of terrorism and 
violent strife that are redrawing borders 
and sending economies backwards.
Global interconnectedness and the rising 
speed of information transmission have 
reinforced the interdependence between 
geopolitics and economics, with 
cyberspace representing an important 
new front in the geopolitical equation as 
cyber attacks have the growing potential 
to inflict economic damage. This makes 
it difficult for decision-makers to predict 
the development of such situations 
as sanctions and other instruments 
of economic coercion, thus raising 
the risk of unintended consequences. 
The interplay between geopolitics and 
economics can create, reinforce and 
alter the nature of the interconnections 
between global risks, affecting many 
areas of public policy and international 
cooperation.
Governments and businesses alike 
need to conduct “geopolitical due 
diligence” to not be caught off guard. 
The focus below is on three areas where 
direct effects are likely – disruptions to 
international trade, and threats to political 
cooperation and the international rules-
based system.
How Is this Situation Manifested? 
In a retreat from the prevailing logic 
of globalization that characterized 
the 1990s and early 2000s, today’s 
international environment is in large 
part marked by self-interested nation 
states trying to gain relative power over 
others, even at the expense of economic 
considerations. Rising unemployment 
and more difficult fiscal situations 
are contributing to the more inward 
orientation of economies. The growth 
of trade along global value chains and 
intensifying financial linkages have 
increased the economic cost of rising 
protectionist policies, such as tariffs, 
sanctions and trade wars, as described 
in Box 2.1. 
As states turn inwards, their international 
economic policies tend to focus on 
collaboration with smaller groups of like-
minded countries that would allow them 
to better pursue their economic goals. 
Countries have always sought to achieve 
both geopolitical and economic aims 
through regional economic integration 
– the European Economic Community, 
for example, was established to stabilize 
relations and raise the stakes in case 
of war as well as to increase market 
size and economic opportunities. Many 
regional groupings are established as 
they allow countries to gain relative 
power over others. This type of thinking 
is currently why the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is 
seeking to create a unified market by 
Global Risks 201528
P
art 1
P
art 2
P
art 3
Table 2.1: East Asian-Pacific Free Trade Agreements
      Part of the agreement                Not part of the agreement  
 
Source: ASEAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, The Economist and Oliver Wyman analysis.
Notes: 1 RCEP, promoted by ASEAN, would also include Cambodia, India, Laos and Myanmar.
                   2 TPP, promoted by the US, would also include Canada, Chile, Mexico and Peru as well as the US.
                   3 FTAAP, promoted by China, would also include Hong Kong SAR, Papua New Guinea, Russian Fed. and Taiwan, China.
                   4 Planned or achieved. Korea’s free trade agreements (additionally with Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) are             
______ through its agreement with ASEAN.
Country RCEP1 TPP2 FTAAP3
Korea, Rep. 
bilateral4
Australia
Brunei
Cambodia
China, People’s Rep.
Indonesia
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
New Zealand
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
2015 and pursuing an agreement on 
a Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP). It is also one of the 
drivers of the United States’ efforts to 
pursue discussions on two major free 
trade and investment agreements – the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). 
However, in some cases competing 
integration agreements are creating 
strategic competition: in Latin America, 
the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur 
provide different models of integration; in 
Ukraine, the country was torn between 
the European Union and the Eurasian 
Economic Union; and Asian countries 
need to assess the US-led TPP and the 
ASEAN-led RCEP. As illustrated by Table 
2.1, the current situation is a complex mix 
of overlapping and competing regional 
negotiations. 
A driver of the intensifying interplay 
between economics and geopolitics 
is the growing direct role of the state in 
the world economy, which is affecting 
traditional trade and investment flows 
and potentially enabling countries to 
exert geopolitical influence through 
economic dependency. This trend 
is manifested in increasing state-
led investments in other countries’ 
infrastructure, such as in the case 
of Chinese investment in Africa or 
Latin America; strategic investments 
by sovereign wealth funds and 
state-owned enterprises in land and 
businesses in other countries, as 
seen in the case of Gulf economies’ 
investments in Africa, and government 
purchases of other governments’ debt. 
In August 2014, China and Japan held 
7.2% and 7% of US debt, respectively.
To strengthen their geopolitical 
position, countries have also reverted 
to measures that control access 
to economically important national 
resources or the prices of commodities 
over which they exert monopoly 
power to undermine other economies’ 
performance. These potential ways to 
leverage power over other countries 
through economic links are increasingly 
becoming an explicit part of foreign 
policy thinking.
In today’s interdependent global 
economy, whenever countries focus 
on their domestic market – even if 
the decisions are taken by central 
banks rather than politicians – there 
is potential for unintended effects on 
other countries to spill over into the 
geopolitical sphere. For instance, one 
side effect of Japan’s expansionary 
monetary policies to restart its domestic 
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Box 2.1: Global supply chains 
– too lean? 
With the opening of markets 
worldwide and the reduction of 
barriers to the flow of goods and 
capital, the creation of value has 
become a complex process 
spanning countries and continents. 
The far-reaching global supply chains 
set up by multinational corporations 
are more efficient, but the complexity 
and fragility of their interlinkages 
make them vulnerable to systemic 
risks, causing major disruptions. 
These comprise natural disasters, 
including those related to climate 
change; global or regional 
pandemics; geopolitical instability, 
such as conflicts, disruptions of 
critical sea lines of communication 
and other trade routes; terrorism; 
large-scale failures in logistics; 
unstable energy prices and supply; 
and surges in protectionism leading 
to export/import restrictions. 
Recent specific examples of threats 
to the smooth functioning of global 
supply chains include the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, tensions in 
the Middle East and the dispute 
between Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation. The latter has caused 
disruptions in the supply of gas to 
European countries, while sanctions 
imposed by the European Union and 
the Russian Federation have 
restricted access to specific sets of 
goods and forced some companies 
to review the architecture of their 
supply chains. One effect is 
Germany’s exports to Russia were 
reduced by 26.1% in comparison to 
the year before, as reported in August 
2014. 
economy has been the devaluation of 
the yen by about 50% in recent years, 
much to the detriment of its neighbours, 
while quantitative easing in the United 
States has impacted international 
capital flows into emerging markets.
Global Risks Emerging from the 
Interplay between Geopolitics and 
Economics
Opinion polls show that the public in 
countries such as Japan, Germany 
and the United States are increasingly 
sceptical about the benefits of trade 
and foreign investment, even as their 
governments push for increased 
liberalization. Despite progress on the 
trade facilitation agreement, the larger 
Doha Round of trade negotiations has 
stalled, costing an estimated $180 
billion per year at the global level. 
Negotiations of regional agreements 
are also being questioned (one example 
is TTIP in Germany). Although growing 
again, global flows of foreign direct 
investment remain down by more than 
a quarter from their 2007 peak, and 
international trade growth has slowed 
since 2012. It has yet to be determined, 
however, whether this is merely a 
cyclical or structural phenomenon 
heralding a phase of de-globalization 
in which globalized markets give way 
to regional groupings and to a rise in 
protectionist measures.2 
When confronted with political and 
economic volatility at home, countries 
often revert to protectionism under the 
guise of policies to reduce risk. A recent 
OECD report shows that despite their 
professed commitment to free trade, 
G20 economies have increasingly 
reverted to protective measures since 
growth slowed in 2012 in the wake of 
the global financial crisis.3 Protectionism 
can take different forms. It can be 
related, for example, to the protection 
of strategic sectors, local content 
requirements in the case of external 
investment, or state bailouts.
Economic sanctions are another type 
of punitive geo-economic measure, 
such as the tit-for-tat engaged in by 
Russia and the West, which indicates 
that some countries are ready to 
countenance a long period of economic 
hardship and diplomatic woe to achieve 
their political goals. The risk is thus 
significant that if the use of punitive 
geo-economic measures becomes 
more widespread, a growing number 
of countries may revert to protecting 
national producers and supply chains, 
which could considerably impact global 
trade flows. The economic effects of 
sanctions can include slow growth, 
unemployment and fiscal pressures. 
Taken together, the slowdown in 
globalization, the rise in protectionism 
and the increasing prevalence of 
sanctions could give rise to a scenario 
of slower growth in advanced and 
emerging economies. Slower growth 
in emerging economies could translate 
into social unrest and political instability 
if the aspirations of large portions of the 
population cannot be met. 
The Increasing Risk to the 
Architecture of Global Governance
Much of the interplay between 
economic and geopolitical interests 
plays out not in the trade arena but 
in the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Countries’ inability to agree on an 
institutionalized, closer coordination 
of macroeconomic policies to reduce 
global imbalances provides an 
interesting example. Some observers 
see the failure to mitigate these 
imbalances, combined with the return 
of strategic competition in an era 
defined by an erosion of trust, as raising 
a tail-risk possibility of undermining the 
Bretton Woods institutions themselves 
and the international rule-based system 
more generally.
These developments are reflected in 
the recent alternative structures being 
established by selected countries. 
Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2014 
set up the New Development Bank, 
the so-called BRICs Bank, which 
is intended to lend up to $34 billion 
globally, particularly for infrastructure 
projects. In the same year, together 
with 20 other countries, China created 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank for the Asia-Pacific region. Much 
as a retreat from global multilateralism 
is worrisome, stronger regional 
multilateralism is not necessarily a bad 
thing, as regional solutions to regional 
problems can be consistent with global 
governance structures. As already 
noted, although economic integration 
is not often explicitly targeted, it binds 
nations more closely together politically. 
Some observers see the current push 
Global Risks 201530
P
art 1
P
art 2
P
art 3
for RCEP as a means to restore trust 
in Asia, stabilize security situations and 
find solutions at a regional level to other 
ongoing problems.
Some observers also see the TPP and 
TTIP as the last chance for the United 
States and Europe to bring many 
developing countries into alignment 
with a liberal economic institutional 
framework by creating a domestic 
market big enough to be able to set 
the rules in the global economy – an 
implicit recognition that current global 
governance institutions are no longer 
functioning effectively enough to 
achieve this goal. Yet, increasingly, 
negotiating countries question the 
benefits of these mega regional 
agreements.
Any weakening of global governance 
could weaken collective resilience to 
global risks, which respect no national 
borders and require multilateral 
responses. These include climate 
change, where an inability to agree 
on carbon reductions could result in 
rising sea levels, more frequent storms 
and stress to water supplies; migration 
flows, where pressures on societies 
and resources could result in conflict; 
and Internet governance, where a 
tendency towards fragmentation can 
already be observed through some 
large economies’ efforts to put into 
place measures to protect their national 
networks. Should a global governance 
solution to the Internet not be found, 
further fragmentation could significantly 
reduce the benefits of communication 
and information networks that the 
world has come to take for granted.
What Can Be Done?
At a time of highly interconnected 
challenges that can only be addressed 
through global cooperation, 
reducing the barriers to international 
collaboration is crucial, as no 
collaboration is the worst possible 
outcome. What can stakeholders do to 
strengthen international collaboration 
and to reduce the risk of negative 
effects of geo-economic measures?  
Many of the challenges related to 
international collaboration reflect a 
lack of trust among the key players. 
Strengthening trust among leaders 
and populations in global economies 
is therefore key to ensuring effective 
collaboration at a time when strategic 
competition dominates international 
relations. Without trust, no decisions 
at the international level will be taken. 
However, the responsibility extends 
beyond the political level: multinational 
companies and consumers also have a 
role to play to strengthen the argument 
in favour of global collaboration in the 
face of growing pressures to prioritize 
national economic self-interest. 
Conclusion
Faced with competing strategic pivots 
and governments’ growing tendency 
to look inwards and prioritize their 
domestic producers and economies, 
and with an increased reliance on 
economic levers as a means to gain 
geopolitical influence, the coming years 
could see competitive relationships 
between the major powers develop 
into trade and currency wars, requiring 
economic diplomacy.
While regional institutions and 
alternative structures have a role, global 
institutions must respond to pressure 
to better reflect the rising wealth and 
power of emerging economies. They 
remain the most promising means for 
Box 2.2: The World Economic Forum’s work on geo-economics 
The World Economic Forum is developing a clearer understanding of the 
interaction between geopolitics and economics with the support of its 
Network of Global Agenda Councils. The Global Agenda Council on Geo-
economics aims to become the world’s leading network of thinkers on the 
impact of geopolitics on the global economy and vice versa – launching a 
vital global discussion that links leaders from the worlds of politics, 
economics and business in a debate about the major trends that are 
changing the world. The Council will publish an annual brief identifying the 
main geo-economic issues on the horizon and delve into the implications of 
emerging developments, such as the use of sanctions or low oil prices for 
different regions, actors and sectors. Issues that will be examined in more 
depth include the next phase of economic warfare, the next wave of state 
capitalism (including the rise of central banks as drivers of geo-economics 
and the rise of strategic sectors), the idea of gated globalization, the role of 
infrastructure in building alliances, and the weakening of peripheral countries 
by regional agreements. The Forum’s work will also include an assessment of 
impact on selected industries. It will be developed over the coming years and 
the findings will be integrated into the work of the Forum and its communities. 
competing powers to build strategic 
trust, which could minimize the 
detrimental effects of geo-economic 
competition on growth and prosperity.
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2.3 City Limits: The Risks 
of Rapid and Unplanned 
Urbanization in Developing 
Countries
The world is experiencing a historically 
unprecedented transition from 
predominantly rural to urban living. 
In 1950, one-third of the world’s 
population lived in cities; today the 
number has already reached more 
than one-half, and in 2050 city 
dwellers are expected to account for 
more than two-thirds of the world’s 
population (see Figure 2.1).4 This rapid 
rise will mainly take place in developing 
countries (see Figure 2.2).5 Africa and 
Asia – both still comparatively less 
urbanized than other regions – will 
be the fastest urbanizing regions with 
the urban population projected to 
reach 56% in Africa and 64% in Asia 
by 2050 (currently at 40% and 48%, 
respectively).6 These developments 
imply an unprecedented shift of the 
urban world away from the north-west 
to the south and east.7
If managed well, urbanization can bring 
important benefits for development. 
Cities are an efficient way of organizing 
people’s lives: they enable economies 
of scale and network effects, and 
reduce the need for transportation, 
thereby making economic activity more 
environmentally friendly. The proximity 
and diversity of people can spark 
innovation and create employment 
as exchanging ideas breeds new 
ideas. The diversity of cities can also 
inculcate social tolerance and provide 
opportunities for civic engagement. 
Already today, the linkages between 
cities form the backbone of global 
trade, and cities overall generate a large 
majority of the world’s GDP.
One of the main factors driving rapid 
urbanization in emerging economies 
is rural-urban migration motivated by 
the prospect of greater employment 
opportunities and the hope of a better 
life in cities. Indeed, when a certain 
critical mass of population is reached, 
it is economically viable to deliver 
many infrastructure projects, such 
as public transportation. However, a 
higher population density also creates 
negative externalities, especially when 
urbanization is rapid, poorly-planned 
Figure 2.1: Global Urban Population Growth (1950-2050)
Figure 2.2: Forecasted Urban Population Growth 2010-2050
Source: World Economic Forum calculation based on World Urbanization Prospects (2014 revision) data.
Source: World Economic Forum calculation based on World Urbanization Prospects (2014 revision) data.
and occurs in a context of widespread 
poverty.8 Estimates suggest that 40% 
of the world’s urban expansion is taking 
place in slums, exacerbating socio-
economic disparities and creating 
unsanitary conditions that facilitate the 
spread of disease.9 The example of the 
1994 outbreak of pneumonic plague in 
the Indian city of Surat suggests how, 
in a worst-case scenario, poverty and 
a pandemic in a large-scale informal 
settlement could potentially lead to a 
breakdown in urban order.10 
Rapid urbanization can alter the nature 
of almost every global risk considered 
in this report by influencing its likelihood 
and impact. In addition, cities are points 
of convergence of many risks, which 
make them particularly vulnerable 
to chain reactions and amplify the 
interconnection between global risks. 
Better knowledge of how such risks 
interconnect in their materialization at 
the city level is the first step towards 
helping cities build resilience. Three 
regions – South Asia, East Asia and 
the Pacific, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean – have identified this risk 
as among those for which they are 
the least prepared (Figure 1.7 and for 
more details see: www.weforum.org/
risks).11 The following sections consider 
four selected and particularly daunting 
urban challenges: infrastructure, health, 
climate change and social instability. 
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The Infrastructure Challenge
The quality of a city’s infrastructure 
– its housing, electricity, roads, 
airports, public transport, drinking 
water, sanitation, waste management, 
flood defences, telecommunications, 
hospitals, schools and so forth – largely 
determines its residents’ quality of 
life, social inclusion and economic 
opportunities. It also largely determines 
the city’s resilience to a number of 
global risks, in particular environmental, 
social and health-related risks, 
but also economic risks, such as 
unemployment. Indeed, the availability 
and quality of infrastructure are at 
the core of many of the challenges 
faced by rapidly urbanizing cities 
in developing countries, which are 
developed further in this section of the 
report.
As cities in developing countries 
are expanding rapidly, it is likely 
that infrastructure will not be able 
to keep pace with their growth nor 
the increased expectations of their 
populations. Action to close the 
infrastructure gap is urgently needed 
and will strongly influence the potential 
of risks to have catastrophic cascading 
effects.
To provide adequate global 
infrastructure for electricity, road and 
rail transport, the OECD estimates that 
telecommunications and water will cost 
approximately $71 trillion by 2030 – an 
enormous challenge as it represents 
about 3.5% of forecasted global GDP.12 
Most of this investment will be needed 
in emerging economies. For instance, 
the Programme for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa estimates that 
Africa will need to invest up to $93 
billion annually until 2020 for both 
capital investment and maintenance; 
currently only $45 billion is financed, 
which leaves an infrastructure gap of 
$48 billion per year to be financed.13  
In addition to the provision of 
infrastructure, it is critical to consider 
its location as risks can emerge if 
developed in the wrong location relative 
to the needs of the population. 
Where will the money come from? 
Most governments are under tight 
budget constraints and many 
developing countries already spend 
a large proportion of their national 
income to meet the basic needs of their 
population.14 Consequently, cities are 
looking for public-private collaboration 
to involve the private sector in the 
design, construction and maintenance 
of infrastructure. However, to promote 
successful public-private collaboration, 
corruption must be tackled, as it is 
a traditional problem in construction 
Box 2.3: Life in the city – how smart is smart?  
Like industry, cities are increasingly investing in information technology-based 
systems to address the challenges of managing large enterprises and enabling 
service innovations. While these investments often deliver rapid improvements in 
efficiency and operational continuity, they also create unexpected new risks: 
bugs and brittleness. 
The growing amount of software used to manage urban infrastructure increases 
the likelihood of coding errors that can cause catastrophic failures, especially in 
highly-centralized control systems. For instance, in 2006, San Francisco’s Bay 
Area Rapid Transit network was laid low for days when initial efforts to fix a bug 
inadvertently triggered a larger and longer outage.
Smart city systems also rely on many underlying technology platforms that are 
surprisingly brittle. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) is not only 
relied on for navigation services but also serves an irreplaceable time 
synchronization function. Likewise, thousands of smart city apps and websites 
rely for their core computational capability on the cloud computing infrastructure 
of companies such as Amazon, which have experienced several major outages 
in recent years.
The brittleness of mobile cellular networks presents a special challenge to 
resilience for large cities. Unlike the Internet – which, at least in theory, 
possesses significant resilience through its multiple, redundant linkages – 
cellular networks have several choke points. Cell sites themselves can be 
damaged physically. More importantly, the supporting wired infrastructures for 
electrical power and “backhaul” connections to the communications grid can 
fail: both the Japanese tsunami in 2011 and Superstorm Sandy in 2012 caused 
damage to cellular networks that took weeks to repair. The most dangerous 
failure mode for cellular networks is due to congestion – during crises, panic 
dialling frequently overwhelms the carefully-managed wireless spectrum these 
networks depend on.
All levels of government will need to be more assertive in auditing and stress-
testing vital digital infrastructures. The sudden and unexpected failure of these 
systems during crises has crippling knock-on effects across official and civilian 
response and relief efforts. Even during peacetime, the economic and social 
effects of bugs and brittleness can be devastating, with potential for long-lasting 
impacts. Assessments must go beyond cybersecurity, as the risks are not just 
about external threats but also about the fundamentally unstable dynamics of 
digital infrastructures and the complex, chaotic and unpredictable ways they 
can interact with civic, social and economic systems.
projects and dissuades investors. In 
addition, the key enablers of public-
private collaboration at the city level 
include factors such as transparency 
(in such matters as partner selection 
and contract execution) and the 
availability of accurate data to allow 
risk assessments. Public-private 
collaboration is a way for cities to 
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Box 2.4: Health in cities – robust plans are needed to face the threat of pandemics  
 
Dense urban living facilitates the spread of infectious diseases. Particular vulnerabilities exist in countries where rapid 
urbanization results in informal settlements that make it difficult to control transmission and can therefore increase the risks of 
mosquito-transmitted epidemics, such as malaria, tuberculosis, dengue and yellow fever. 
Various examples highlight the impact of urbanization on pandemics. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 83% of 
people with tuberculosis live in cities1 (around 40% of the population lives in urban areas).2 In 2009, Mexico City shut down 
schools, libraries, museums and nightclubs to halt the spread of H1N1 flu. A 2009 cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe heavily 
affected Harare city, Chitungwiza and Kadoma, also stressing the influence of slums and the lack of urban infrastructure as 
key igniting factors for the speed and severity of disease outbreaks.3
In today’s hyperconnected world, it is easier for pathogens to be carried from one city to another and quickly scale up the 
impact of most outbreaks. The presumed introduction of the virus to the informal settlements of Kenema and Freetown in 
Sierra Leone has undoubtedly augmented its spread. Sierra Leone is urbanizing at a rate of 3% each year, and in 2005 more 
than 97% of its urban population lived in slums.4 The economic impact of Ebola is enormous for the affected countries and 
their neighbouring countries. The estimated economic cost is $32 billion in the worst-case scenario.5
Another aggravating factor to the 2014 Ebola crisis was the lack of a governance mechanism that would allow an effective link 
between what was being observed at the country and city levels and the alert mechanisms necessary to trigger an 
emergency response. Looking into the future for an adequate response across geographies, the existence of such a 
governance mechanism would: (i) allow collaboration between local and national governments, civil society and the private 
sector across borders; (ii) coordinate the surveillance, collection, sharing and analysis of infectious disease data in real time; 
(iii) incentivize the private sector to develop and scale up the production and distribution of affordable drugs, vaccines and 
diagnostics; (iv) establish a network of centres for research into microbial threats; and (v) promote international standards for 
best laboratory, regulatory and ethical practice.6
The vulnerability of urban centres to pandemics points to the need for strong public-private coordination involving 
organizations beyond the traditional healthcare sector. The ability to mobilize a response from sectors as diverse as food 
production, telecommunications and corporate supply chains will determine how epidemics are fought in the future. Local, 
national and cross-border government agencies need to build bridges with all stakeholders and learn from what worked in 
the past to shape systems with the capacity to respond to pandemics and build the resilience to bounce back afterwards. 
Coordinating responses and developing global governance mechanisms are critical to contain future outbreaks, which will 
inevitably occur. 
identify where cooperation can address 
problems that neither municipalities 
nor the private sector can solve 
alone (for example in advanced 
telecommunications infrastructure) and 
both will have a major role to play. 
Much discussion revolves around the 
potential for technology to increase 
the efficiency with which urban 
infrastructure can be managed. 
The use of big data, the Internet of 
Things and ubiquitous smartphones 
promise to revolutionize aspects 
of city management, from keeping 
traffic flowing to reducing electricity 
outages, tackling crime and preparing 
for emergencies. Developing countries 
have the opportunity to leapfrog by 
avoiding the mistakes made by more 
advanced countries and applying the 
lessons learned from the development 
of smart city infrastructure. However, 
while “smart cities” should work better, 
they may also be more vulnerable 
to cyber error or terror (see Box 
2.3). When discussing “smart cities” 
it is important to note the human 
component. Indeed, if technology 
developed for smart cities does not 
embrace universal design to ensure 
use by all (including the disabled 
and the elderly), its benefits could be 
controversial. 
Cities and Health
In most countries, the health of city 
dwellers has improved through better 
access to education and healthcare, 
better living conditions and targeted 
public-health interventions.15  
Notes: 
1 WHO, 2010.
2 United Nations DESA, 2014.
3 WHO, 2009. 
4 Gire et al., 2014.
5 World Bank Group, 2014.
6 Rubin and Saidel, 2014.
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One excellent case study is the city 
of Surat in India. Hitting rock bottom 
due to a public health disaster in 1994, 
it introduced measures to drastically 
raise hygienic standards, making it one 
of the cleanest cities in India today.16 
However, when urbanization is rapid 
and unplanned, a combination of high 
population density, poverty and lack 
of infrastructure – especially water and 
waste management – can create the 
conditions for communicable diseases 
to flourish. 
Almost 700 million urban dwellers 
currently lack adequate sanitation.17 
The problem is particularly acute 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and south-
central Asia, where 62% and 43%, 
respectively, of the urban population 
live in slums.18 Such conditions create 
increased risks of illnesses, worm 
infections, cholera and diarrhoea – a 
leading cause of preventable death in 
children – and help spread emerging 
infectious diseases, such as Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
and H1N1 influenza.19 With the 
projected huge increase of populations 
living in slums and the growing 
sophistication of transport networks 
between cities, the spread of infectious 
diseases could happen extremely 
quickly and could be difficult to contain, 
creating the risk of global disease 
outbreaks.
In addition to communicable diseases, 
rapid and unplanned urbanization is a 
key driver in the increased prevalence 
of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 
and their key risk factors, such as 
unhealthy diets, physical inactivity, 
tobacco consumption, harmful use of 
alcohol and pollution.20 NCDs, including 
cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, 
cancer and chronic respiratory 
diseases, are the leading cause 
of death globally. These diseases 
affect high-, middle- and low-income 
countries. Every year 38 million people 
die from NCDs; over 14 million die 
prematurely – before they reach the 
age of 70 and 85% are in low- and 
middle-income countries.21
The prevalence of diabetes in emerging 
economies is rising: in China, it is 
already comparable to that in the 
United States: in 2013, the figures 
were 9% and 9.2%, respectively. In 
Kuwait, diabetes prevalence has been 
as high as 23%; even in a low-income 
country such as Burundi, it reached 
4.5%.22 Although a formal link between 
diabetes and urbanization has not 
been established, the number of urban 
dwellers with diabetes in low- and 
middle-income countries is projected 
to almost double from 181 million today 
to 347 million people in 2035.23 In 
India for example, diabetes prevalence 
is close to epidemic proportion and 
is attributed - at least partially - to 
urbanization.24 This will put huge 
pressure on already fragile healthcare 
systems, the collapse of which could 
have devastating cascading effects 
with dramatic economic losses.
Addressing non-communicable 
diseases will require efforts to tackle 
the causes of air pollution, which is 
estimated to have caused 7 million 
deaths in 2012.25 Air pollution tends to 
be more of a problem in developing 
than developed countries, in part due 
to coal-fired power plants and the use 
of biomass for cooking and heating, 
but mostly due to private transport 
vehicles.26 Over 90% of air pollution in 
developing world cities is attributed to 
old, poorly-maintained vehicles running 
on low-quality fuel and to roads prone 
to traffic jams.27 The rapid rise of non-
communicable diseases in low-income 
countries could jeopardize poverty 
reduction and limit inclusive outcomes 
from growth. 
Cities and Climate Change
In many developing countries, 
migration from rural areas to cities is at 
least partially driven by the increasing 
prevalence of extreme weather, such 
as land degradation and desertification, 
making agriculture more difficult. For 
example, many people are migrating 
from dry land areas in north-east Brazil 
to favelas in Rio de Janeiro.28 The 
rapid, inadequate and poorly planned 
expansion of cities in developing 
countries can also leave urban 
populations highly exposed to the 
effects of climate change. For example, 
cities tend to be located near the sea 
or natural waterways, where they are 
more at risk of flooding. Indeed, 15 of 
the world’s 20 megacities – those with 
over 10 million inhabitants – are located 
in coastal zones threatened by sea-
level rise and storm surges.29 
The concentration of people, assets, 
critical infrastructure and economic 
activities in cities exacerbates the 
potential of natural catastrophes 
to cause unprecedented damage: 
heatwaves, extreme rainfall and 
drought-related shortages of water and 
food will increasingly test the resilience 
of infrastructure in these and other 
cities. The effects of shortfalls are likely 
to be felt mostly by the poor, whose 
informal settlements tend to be on land 
at especially high risk from extreme 
weather.30 Making cities more resilient 
to extreme weather events should be a 
priority for both local governments and 
the private sector.
Cities not only need to adapt to climate 
change, they also have a major role 
to play in mitigating its impact. While 
established cities with efficient mass 
transit systems have relatively low 
carbon footprints, the early phases of 
urbanization tend to generate massive 
greenhouse gas emissions as the 
construction of infrastructure uses 
concrete and metals that are carbon-
intensive to manufacture.31 Developing 
countries already account for around 
two-thirds of annual greenhouse 
gas emissions, caused in part by 
their economic growth and rapid 
urbanization.32 The rapid expansion 
of their cities means that mitigation 
measures have to be taken today to 
help tackle climate change.
With adequate land-use planning and 
in coordination with the private sector, 
cities can develop infrastructure in 
more sustainable, low-carbon ways – 
but this requires governance, technical, 
financial and institutional capacities 
that are often lacking in developing 
countries.33 Leadership within local 
governments is at the heart of both 
urban mitigation of and adaptation to 
climate change.34 Well-governed cities 
with universal provision of infrastructure 
and services have a strong base for 
building resilience to climate change 
if processes of planning, design and 
allocation of human capital and material 
resources are responsive to emerging 
climate risks.
Social Instability
Cities’ capacity to generate prosperity 
already largely determines global 
growth: just over half the world’s 
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population lives in cities, but they 
generate more than 80% of global 
GDP. In addition, most future growth 
will be generated by midsized cities 
and not by megacities, as is commonly 
believed.35 Ultimately, new migrants in 
cities are expected to create greater 
economic value than they would have 
in the countryside. However, even 
when cities are successful, the process 
of absorbing migrants into urban 
economies is not necessarily smooth. 
While moving to a city offers individuals 
more opportunities to improve their 
living conditions, the high cost of living 
and competition for livelihoods can also 
trap people in poverty.36 
Many of the risks described above can 
lead to social instability. It is the rapid 
and unplanned nature of urbanization, 
rather than urbanization itself, that is 
linked by many researchers to such 
risks as urban violence and social 
unrest.37 Rapid urbanization in the 
developing world can quickly bring 
together large numbers of unemployed 
youth, a common ingredient of social 
unrest. Widening inequalities also tend 
to be more starkly visible in urban than 
rural areas, with the most wealthy areas 
of cities often neighbouring quickly-
expanding slums. The combination 
of inequality, competition over scarce 
resources such as land, impunity from 
the law and weak city governance 
increases the risk of violence and 
potential breakdowns in law and order. 
Some cities in developing countries 
are already extremely dangerous, 
such as for example San Pedro Sula in 
Honduras, with 169 killings per 100,000 
residents in 2011.38
Rapid urbanization and the related 
growing demand for housing are 
creating pressure on the housing 
market and social tensions are 
expected to increase. The shortage of 
affordable housing not only contributes 
to social exclusion, it can also threaten 
to destabilize the wider economy if the 
housing price increase fuels property 
bubbles. Making housing more 
accessible, affordable and adequate 
for urban dwellers is therefore of critical 
importance. A wide portfolio of policies, 
from limiting excessive credit to 
optimizing land use and development 
activity in cities, is crucial to mitigate 
these risks and equitably distribute the 
benefits of urban growth.
Conclusion: The Importance of City 
Governance
Urbanization creates opportunities but 
also exacerbates risks, and the speed 
at which it is happening challenges 
our capacity to plan and adapt. This 
is particularly true in developing 
economies. For rapid urbanization to 
provide opportunities to all, carefully 
considered urban planning and good 
governance with effective regulatory 
frameworks are required. However, 
governments of rapidly-growing cities 
often have little time for adjustment 
and learning. As a consequence, 
inadequate planning and ineffective 
governance can bring significant 
economic, social and environmental 
costs, threatening the sustainability of 
urban development.
The inability of governments to provide 
appropriate infrastructure and public 
services is at the core of many urban 
challenges in developing countries, 
which range from the incapacity 
to contain infectious disease to 
the challenges of building climate-
resilient cities. At the same time, these 
challenges have worsened due to 
the rapid and chaotic development of 
cities. City leaders from government, 
civil society and the private sector 
are ideally positioned to plan rapid 
urbanization and must act to sustain 
metropolitan growth.
What is more, as the world continues 
to urbanize, power will increasingly 
be concentrated in cities. This power 
– ranging from economic to social  
not only makes cities the centre of 
gravity, but offers greater scope to 
find practical solutions to the most 
pressing challenges. Indeed, many 
observers and organizations are now 
focusing on cities and the connections 
between them rather than directing 
their attention at the national level. 
The strength of city-level institutions 
in addition to national institutions – 
their capacity to be flexible, innovative 
and dynamic, and effectively involve 
multiple stakeholders in governance 
– will largely determine whether 
urbanization makes the world more 
resilient or more vulnerable in the face 
of global risks.
–
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2.4 Engineering the Future: 
How Can the Risks and 
Rewards of Emerging 
Technologies Be 
Balanced?
From networked medical devices to 
the Internet of Things, from drought-
resistant crops to bionic prosthetics, 
emerging technologies promise to 
revolutionize a wide range of sectors 
and transform traditional relationships.39 
Their impacts will range from the 
economic to the societal, cultural, 
environmental and geopolitical.
Emerging technologies hold great and 
unprecedented opportunities. Some 
examples are explored in detail in three 
boxes presented in this section: 
♦ Synthetic biology could create 
bacteria that turn biomass into 
diesel (Box 2.6).
♦ Gene drives could assist in the 
eradication of insect-borne diseases 
such as malaria (Box 2.7).
♦ Artificial intelligence is behind 
advances from self-driving cars to 
personal care robots (Box 2.8).
Discoveries are proceeding quickly in 
the laboratory, and once technologies 
demonstrate their usefulness in the real 
world, they attract significantly more 
investments and develop at an even 
greater pace.
However, how emerging technologies 
evolve is highly uncertain. Their 
potential second- or third-order effects 
cannot easily be anticipated, such that 
designing safeguards against them 
is difficult. Even if the ramifications of 
technologies could be foreseen as 
they emerge, the trade-offs would 
still need to be considered. Would 
the large-scale use of fossil fuels for 
industrial development have proceeded 
had it been clear in advance that 
it would lift many out of poverty 
but introduce the legacy of climate 
change? Would the Haber-Bosch 
process have been sanctioned had 
it been evident it would dramatically 
increase agricultural food production 
but adversely impact biodiversity?40 
A range of currently emerging 
technologies could have similar or 
even more profound implications for 
mankind’s future. Survey respondents 
Box 2.5: Classifying emerging technologies 
In general, three broad categories of emerging technologies can be 
distinguished: first, those to do with information, the Internet and data transfer, 
which include artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things and big data; second, 
biological technologies, such as the genetic engineering of drought-resistant 
crops and biofuel, lab-grown meat, and new therapeutic techniques based on 
RNA1, genomics and microbiomes; and third, chemical technologies, those 
involved in making stronger materials (such as nanostructure carbon-fibre 
composites) and better batteries (through germanium nanowires, for example), 
recycling nuclear waste and mining metals from the by-products of water 
desalination plants.
However, any attempt to categorize emerging technologies is difficult because 
many new advances are interdisciplinary in nature. In particular, information 
technology underlies many, if not all, advances in emerging technology. A final 
category of cross-over technologies would include smart grids in the electricity 
supply industry, brain-computer interfaces and bioinformatics –  
the growing capacity to use technology to model and understand biology.
Note:  
1 RNA stands for ribonucleic acid; it is one of the three major biological macromolecules that are essential 
for all known forms of life (along with DNA and proteins). A central tenet of molecular biology states that the 
flow of genetic information in a cell goes from DNA through RNA to proteins: “DNA makes RNA makes 
protein”. Proteins are the workhorses of the cell; they play leading roles in the cell as enzymes, as structural 
components, and in cell signalling, to name just a few. For more information see the RNA Society at http://
www.rnasociety.org/about/what-is-rna/. 
highlighted technological risks as highly 
connected to man-made environmental 
catastrophes.
Emerging technology is a broad and 
loose term (see Box 2.5), and debate 
about potential risks and benefits is 
more vigorous in some areas than in 
others. In the examples that follow, 
the focus is on technologies that are 
considered to have wide benefits and 
for which there is strong pressure for 
development, as well as high levels 
of concern about potential risks and 
safeguards.
Causes for Concern
Risks of undesirable impacts of 
emerging technologies can be 
divided into two categories: the 
foreseen and the unforeseen. Some 
examples of foreseen risks are 
leakage of dangerous substances 
through difficulties of containment 
(as is sometimes the case with trials 
of genetically-modified crops) or 
storage errors (as with 2014 security 
failures in US disease-control labs 
handling lethal viruses);41 the theft or 
illegal sale of emerging technologies; 
computer viruses, hacker attacks on 
human transplants42, or chemical or 
biological warfare. The establishment 
of new fundamental capabilities, as is 
happening for example with synthetic 
biology and artificial intelligence, 
is especially associated with risks 
that cannot be fully assessed in the 
laboratory. Once the genie is out of 
the bottle, the possibility exists of 
undesirable applications or effects that 
could not be anticipated at the time of 
invention. Some of these risks could 
be existential – that is, endangering the 
future of human life (see Boxes 2.6 to 
2.8).43 
Both foreseen and unforeseen risks 
are amplified by the accelerating 
speed and complexity of technological 
development. Exponential growth 
in computing power implies the 
potential for a tipping point that 
could significantly amplify risks, while 
hyperconnectivity allows new ideas 
and capabilities to be distributed more 
quickly around the world. The growing 
complexity of new technologies, 
combined with a lack of scientific 
knowledge about their future evolution 
and often a lack of transparency, 
makes them harder for both individuals 
and regulatory bodies to understand.
37Global Risks 2015
P
art 2
P
art 3
P
art 1
Box 2.6: Synthetic biology - protecting mother nature   
For thousands of years, humans have been selectively breeding crops and animals. With the discovery of DNA hybridization in 
the early 1970s, it became possible to genetically modify existing organisms. Synthetic biology goes further: it refers to the 
creation of entirely new living organisms from standardized building blocks of DNA. The technology has been in development 
since the early 2000s, as knowledge and methods for reading, editing and designing genetics have improved, costs of DNA 
sequencing and synthesis have decreased, and computer modelling of proposed designs has become more sophisticated.  
(see Figure 2.6.1)
In 2010 Craig Venter and his team demonstrated that a simple bacterium could be run on entirely artificially-made DNA.1 
Applications of synthetic biology that are currently being developed include producing biofuel from E. coli bacteria; designer 
organisms that act as sensors for pollutants or explosives; optogenetics, in which nerve cells are made light-sensitive and neural 
signals are controlled using lasers, potentially revolutionizing the treatment of neurological disorders; 3D-printed viruses that can 
attack cancer;2 and gene drives as a possible solution to insect-borne diseases (as discussed in Box 2.7). 
Alongside these vast potential benefits are a range of risks. Yeast has already been used to make morphine;3 it is not hard to 
imagine that synthetic biology may allow entirely new pathways for producing illicit drugs. The invention of cheap, synthetic 
alternatives to high-value agricultural exports such as vetiver could suddenly destabilize vulnerable economies by removing a 
source of income on which farmers rely.4 As technology to read DNA becomes more affordable and widely available, privacy 
concerns are raised by the possibility that someone stealing a strand of hair or other genetic material could glean medically-
sensitive information or determine paternity.
The risk that most concerns analysts, however, is the possibility of a synthetized organism causing harm in nature, whether by 
error or terror. Living organisms are self-replicating and can be robust and invasive. The terror possibility is especially pertinent 
because synthetic biology is “small tech” – it does not require large, expensive facilities or easily-tracked resources. Much of its 
power comes from sharing information and, once a sequence has been published online, it is nearly impossible to stop it: a 
“DIYbio” or “biohacker” community exists, sharing inventions in synthetic biology, while the International Genetically Engineered 
Machines competition is a large international student competition in designing organisms, with a commitment to open-sourcing 
the biological inventions.
Conceivably, a single rogue individual might one day be able to devise a weapon of mass destruction – a virus as deadly as Ebola 
and as contagious as flu. What mechanisms could safeguard against such a possibility? Synthetic biology and affordable 
DNA-sequencing also opens up the possibility of designing bespoke viruses as murder weapons: imagine a virus that spreads by 
causing flu-like symptoms and is programmed to cause fatal brain damage if it encounters a particular stretch of DNA found only 
in one individual.5
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Figure 2.6.1: Number of Entities Conducting Research in Synthetic Biology
Source: The Wilson Center 2013
Notes: The “Other” category consists of “Community lab space”, “Military lab” and “Hybrid research/policy”.
No data are available for the categroies “Community Lab Space”, “Military Lab”, and “Hybrid Research Insitution/Policy Center” in 2009 and for the region Asia/
Oceania in 2009
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Synthetic biology is currently governed largely as just another form of genetic engineering. Regulations tend to assume large 
institutional stakeholders such as industries and universities, not small and medium-sized enterprises or amateurs. The 
governance gap is illustrated by the controversy surrounding the very successful 2013 crowdsourcing of bioluminescent plants, 
which exploited a legal loophole dependent on the method used to insert genes.6 The Glowing Plants project, which aims 
ultimately to make trees function as street lights, was able to promise to distribute 600,000 seeds without any oversight by a 
regulatory body other than the discretion of Kickstarter. The project caused concern not only among activists against genetically-
modified organisms, but also among synthetic biology enthusiasts who feared it might cause a backlash against the technology.7 
Differences can already be observed in the focus of DIYbio groups in Europe and the United States due to the differing nature of 
regulations on genetically-modified organisms in their regions, with European enthusiasts focusing more on “bio-art”.8 The 
amateur synthetic biology community is very aware of safety issues and pursuing bottom-up options for self-regulation in various 
ways, such as developing voluntary codes of practice.9 However, self-regulation has been criticized as inadequate, including by 
a coalition of civil society groups campaigning for strong oversight mechanisms.10 Such mechanisms would need to account for 
the cross-border nature of the technology, and inherent uncertainty over its future direction.11
Notes:
1 Gibson, D. et al., 2010. “Creation of a bacterial cell controlled by a chemically synthesized genome”. Science 329 (5987): 52–6
2 See 3dprint.com article “Autodesk Genetic Engineer is Able to 3D Print Viruses, Soon to Attack Cancer Cells”; http://3dprint.com/19594/3d-printed-virus-fights-
cancer/.
3 See Scientific American article “Yeast Coaxed to Make Morphine”; http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode/yeast-coaxed-to-make-morphine/.
4 See Inter Press Service News Agency article “Synthetic Biology Could Open a Whole New Can of Worms”; http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/10/synthetic-biology-could-
open-a-whole-new-can-of-worms/.
5 See The Atlantic article “Hacking the President’s DNA”; http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/hacking-the-presidents-dna/309147/.
6 See A. Evans’ article “Glowing Plants: Natural Lighting with no Electricity”; https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/antonyevans/glowing-plants-natural-lighting-with-no-
electricit, and Scientific American article “Glowing Plants: Crowdsourced Genetic Engineering Project Ignites Controversy”; http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
glowing-plants-controversy-questions-and-answers/.
7 See Crowdfund Insider’s article “Kickstarter Bans GMOs In Wake Of Glowing Plant Campaign”; http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2013/08/20031-kickstarter-bans-
gmos-in-wake-of-glowing-plant-fiasco/.
8 See NCBI literature “European do-it-yourself (DIY) biology: Beyond the hope, hype and horror”; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4158858/.
9 See for example BioScience article “Biosafety Considerations of Synthetic Biology in the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) Competition”; http://
www.biofaction.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/igem-biosafety-2013.pdf; “A Biopunk Manifesto”; https://maradydd.livejournal.com/496085.html; and DIYbio Codes; 
http://diybio.org/codes/.
10 See “The Principles for the Oversight of Synthetic Biology”; http://www.biosafety-info.net/file_dir/15148916274f6071c0e12ea.pdf.
11 Zhang, J.Y. et al., 2011.
Safeguards and Challenges
As illustrated by the boxes on synthetic 
biology, gene drives and artificial 
intelligence, governance regimes that 
could mitigate the risks associated with 
the abuse of emerging technologies – 
from formal regulations through private 
codes of practice to cultural norms – 
present a fundamental challenge that 
has the following main aspects.44
The current regulatory framework 
is insufficient. Regulations are 
comprehensive in some specific 
areas of emerging technology, while 
weak or non-existent in others, even 
if conceptually the areas are similar. 
Consider the example of two kinds 
of self-flying aeroplane: the use of 
autopilot on commercial aeroplanes 
has long been tightly regulated, 
whereas no satisfactory national and 
international policies have yet been 
defined for the use of drones.
Spatial issues include where to 
regulate, whether at the national 
or international level. The latter is 
further complicated by the need to 
translate regulations into rules that 
can be implemented nationally to 
be fully enforceable. Undesirable 
consequences have the scope to cross 
borders, but cultural attitudes differ 
widely. For example, public attitudes 
are more accepting of genetically-
modified produce in the United States 
than the European Union; consequently 
the EU has institutionalized the 
precautionary principle, while 
there is more faith in the US that a 
“technological fix” will be available 
for most challenges.45 Safeguards, 
regulations and governance need to 
combine consistency across countries 
with the strength to address the 
worldwide impacts of potential risks 
and the flexibility to deal with different 
cultural preferences.
The timing issue is that decisions need 
to be taken today for technologies that 
have a highly uncertain future path, 
the consequences of which will be 
visible only in the long term. Regulate 
too heavily at an early stage and a 
technology may thus fail to develop; 
adopt a laissez-faire approach for 
too long, and rapid developments 
may have irrevocable consequences. 
Different kinds of regulatory oversight 
may be needed at different stages: 
when the scientific research is being 
conducted, when the technology 
is being developed, and when the 
technology is being applied. At the 
same time, the natural tendency to 
think short term in policy-making 
needs to be overcome. Compared 
with Internet technology, notably 
the physical and life sciences have 
longer cycles of development and 
need governance regimes to take a 
long-term approach. History shows 
that it can take a long time to reach 
international agreements on emerging 
threats – 60 years for bioweapons, 80 
years for chemical weapons – so it is 
never too early to start discussions.46
The question of who regulates 
becomes significant when it is 
unclear where a new device fits 
into the allocation of responsibility 
across existing regulatory bodies. 
This is an increasingly difficult 
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Sources: Esvelt et al. 2014 and Oye et al. 2014.
Notes:  
1 Begun in particular by Prof. Austin Burt, Imperial College London.
2 CRISPR-Cas9 is a tool that aims to accelerate the technology to edit genomes. It enables an organism’s DNA to be rewritten.
3 See Australia Group, “Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items” (June 2012); www.australia-group.net/en/guidelines.html.
4 Adapted from an interview with Kenneth Oye, MIT, on the regulation of genetic engineering: “3 Questions: Kenneth Oye on the regulation of genetic engineering: 
Political scientist discusses regulatory gaps in assessing the impact of ‘gene drives’”; http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2014/3-questions-kenneth-oye-regulation-genetic-
engineering-0717.
of risk. For example, a new organism 
may escape into the environment 
and cause damage. Weighing risks 
against benefits involves attempting 
to anticipate the issues of tomorrow 
and deciding how to allocate scarce 
regulatory resources among highly 
technical fields.
When a gap in governance exists, 
it may create a vacuum of power 
that could be filled by religious 
movements and action groups 
exerting more influence and potentially 
stifling innovation. With that risk in 
mind, industry players in emerging 
technologies where institutions are 
weak or non-existent may seek to 
respond to a governance gap by 
demonstrating their responsibility 
through self-regulating – as the 
“biohacker” community is attempting in 
synthetic biology. Another example of a 
private player highlighting a governance 
gap is the way Facebook effectively 
exerts regulatory power in online 
identity management and censorship, 
through policies such as forcing 
users to display their real names and 
removing images that it believes the 
majority of users might find offensive.
Box 2.7: Gene drives – promises and regulatory challenges  
In sexually reproducing organisms, most genes have a 50% chance of being inherited by offspring. However, natural 
selection has in some cases favoured certain genes that are inherited more often. For the past decade or so, research has 
been exploring how this could be triggered.1 The “gene drives” method “drives” a gene through a population, stimulating a 
gene to be preferentially inherited. This gene then can spread through a given population, whose characteristics could thus 
be modified by the addition, deletion, editing or even suppression of certain genes.
Gene drives present an unprecedented opportunity to cure some of the most devastating risks to health and the 
environment. Applications are foreseen in the fight against malaria and other insect-borne diseases, which the 
reprogramming of mosquito genomes could potentially eliminate from entire regions. They are also foreseen in combating 
herbicide and pesticide resistance, and in eradicating invasive species that threaten the biodiversity of ecosystems.
Technical challenges remain, relating mainly to the difficulty of editing genomes for programming drives in a way that is 
precise (with only the targeted gene affected) and reversible (to prevent and overwrite possible unwanted changes). A team 
at Harvard University, MIT and the University of California at Berkeley is making huge progress, such that the development 
of purpose-built, engineered gene drives is expected in the next few years.2
However, gene drives carry potential risks to wild organisms, crops and livestock: unintentional damage could possibly be 
triggered and cascade through other connected ecosystems. No clear regulatory framework to deal with gene drives 
currently exists. The US Food and Drug Administration would consider them as veterinary medicines, requiring the 
developers to demonstrate they are safe for animals that need to be protected. So how are they defined? Both the US policy 
on Dual Use Research of Concern, which oversees research that has clear security concerns, and the Australia Group 
Guidelines, a form of private regulations on transfers of biological material, rely on lists of infectious bacterial and viral 
agents.3 They do not have the functional approach that would be needed, for example, to regulate genetic modifications to 
sexually reproducing plants and animals.
Scientists and regulators need to work together from an early stage to understand the challenges, opportunities and risks 
associated with gene drives, and agree in advance to a governance regime that would govern research, testing and release. 
Acting now would allow time for research into areas of uncertainty, public discussion of security and environmental 
concerns, and the development and testing of safety features. Governance standards or regulatory regimes need to be 
developed proactively and flexibly to adapt to the fast-moving development of the science.4 
issue as innovations become more 
interdisciplinary and technologies 
converge. Examples include 
Google Glass, autonomous cars 
and M-healthcare: while all rely on 
Internet standards, they also have 
ramifications in other spheres. Often no 
mechanism exists for deciding which 
existing regulatory body, if any, should 
take responsibility for an emerging 
technology.
Striking a balance between precaution 
and innovation is an overall dilemma. 
Often potentially-beneficial innovations 
cannot be tested without some degree 
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Box 2.8: Artificial intelligence – rise of the machines   
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the discipline that studies how to create software and systems that behave intelligently. AI scientists 
build systems that can solve reasoning tasks, learn from data, make decisions and plans, play games, perceive their 
environments, move autonomously, manipulate objects, respond to queries expressed in human languages, translate between 
languages, and more.
AI has captured the public imagination for decades, especially in the form of anthropomorphized robots, and recent advances 
have pushed AI into popular awareness and use: IBM’s “Watson” computer beat the best human Jeopardy! players; statistical 
approaches have significantly improved Google’s automatic translation services and digital personal assistants such as Apple’s 
Siri; semi-autonomous drones monitor and strike military targets around the world; and Google’s self-driving car has driven 
hundreds of thousands of miles on public roads.
This represents substantial progress since the 1950s, and yet the original dream of a machine that could substitute for arbitrary 
human labour remains elusive. One important lesson has been that, as Hans Moravec wrote in the 1980s, “It is comparatively 
easy to make computers exhibit adult level performance on intelligence tests or playing checkers, and difficult or impossible to 
give them the skills of a one-year-old when it comes to perception and mobility”.1
These and other challenges to AI progress are by now well known within the field, but a recent survey shows that the most-cited 
living AI scientists still expect human-level AI to be produced in the latter half of this century, if not sooner, followed (in a few years 
or decades) by substantially smarter-than-human AI.2 If they are right, such an advance would likely transform nearly every sector 
of human activity.
If this technological transition is handled well, it could lead to enormously higher productivity and standards of living. On the other 
hand, if the transition is mishandled, the consequences could be catastrophic.3 How might the transition be mishandled? 
Contrary to public perception and Hollywood screenplays, it does not seem likely that advanced AI will suddenly become 
conscious and malicious. Instead, according to a co-author of the world’s leading AI textbook, Stuart Russell of the University of 
California, Berkeley, the core problem is one of aligning AI goals with human goals. If smarter-than-human AIs are built with goal 
specifications that subtly differ from what their inventors intended, it is not clear that it will be possible to stop those AIs from using 
all available resources to pursue those goals, any more than chimpanzees can stop humans from doing what they want.4
In the nearer term, however, numerous other social challenges need to be addressed. In the next few decades, AI is anticipated 
to partially or fully substitute for human labour in many occupations, and it is not clear whether human workers can be retrained 
quickly enough to maintain high levels of employment.5 What is more, while previous waves of technology have also created new 
kinds of jobs, this time structural unemployment may be permanent as AI could be better than humans at performing the new 
jobs it creates. This may require a complete restructuring of the economy by raising fundamental questions of the nature of 
economic transactions and what it is that humans can do for each other. Autonomous vehicles and other cases of human-robot 
interaction demand legal solutions fit for the novel combination of automatic decision-making with a capacity for physical harm.6 
Autonomous vehicles will encounter situations where they must weigh the risks of injury to passengers against the risks to 
pedestrians; what will the legal redress be for parties who believe the vehicle decided wrongly? Several nations are working 
towards the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems that can assess information, choose targets and open fire 
without human intervention. Such developments raise new challenges for international law and the protection of non-
combatants.7 Who will be accountable if they violate international law? The Geneva Conventions are unclear. It is also not clear 
when human intervention occurs: before deployment, during deployment? Humans will be involved in programming autonomous 
weapons; the question is whether human control of the weapon ceases at the moment of deployment. AI in finance and other 
domains has introduced risks associated with the fact that AI programmes can make millions of economically significant 
decisions before a human can notice and react, leading for example to a May 2012 trading event that nearly bankrupted Knight 
Capital.8,9
In short, proactive and future-oriented work in many fields is needed to counteract “the tendency of technological advance to 
outpace the social control of technology”.10 
Notes:  
1 Moravec, 1988, p. 15.
2 Müller and Bostrom, 2014. 
3 Bostrom, 2014. 
4 Omohundro, 2008.
5 Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014. 
6 Calo, 2014; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402972.
7 Human Rights Watch, 2012
8 Johnson et al., 2013. 
9 See Reuters, “Error by Knight Capital rips through stock market”;  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/us-usa-nyse-tradinghalts-
idUSBRE8701BN20120801.
10 Posner, 2004, p. 20.
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A fundamental question pertains 
to societal, economic and ethical 
implications. While emerging 
technologies imply the long-term 
possibility of a world of abundance, 
many countries are struggling with 
unemployment and underemployment, 
and even a temporary adjustment due 
to technological advancement could 
undermine social stability. In ethical 
terms, advances in transhumanism, 
using technology to enhance human 
physiology and intelligence, will require 
finding a definition for what people 
mean by human dignity: are enhanced 
human capabilities a basic human 
right, or a privilege for those who can 
pay, even if that exacerbates and 
entrenches inequalities? At the same 
time, governance regimes for emerging 
technologies are strongly influenced by 
the perceptions, opinions and values 
of society – whether people are more 
enthusiastic about a technology’s 
potential benefits than fearful about its 
risks. This is very domain-related, and 
not always rational or proportional: it 
can lead to some technologies being 
over-regulated and others under-
regulated. Many biological technologies 
that touch on beliefs about religion 
and human life, for example, are 
regulated relatively stringently, as 
evidenced by the worldwide prohibition 
on human cloning.47 On the other 
hand, the human propensity to 
anthropomorphize means that robotic 
prototypes in some empathic form of 
assistive technology (such as Paro, a 
baby harp seal lookalike robot assisting 
in the care of people with dementia and 
other health problems) easily capture 
public sympathy, which may ease 
safety, ethical or legal concerns.48,49  In 
other areas, such as lethal autonomous 
weapons, it would probably be easier 
to get close to unanimous public 
support to prohibit them as has been 
the case for landmines. As such, these 
societal implications constitute an 
important risk in themselves, as it is 
difficult to anticipate their impact on the 
use and path of emerging technologies.
Thoughts for the Future 
Emerging technologies are developing 
rapidly. Their far-reaching societal, 
economic, environmental and 
geopolitical implications necessitate 
a debate today to chart the course 
for the future and reap the many 
benefits but avoid the risks of emerging 
technologies. This is not a trivial task 
given the many interdependencies 
and uncertainties and the fact that 
many challenges transcend the 
spheres of decision-makers both 
across technologies and borders. 
Regulators face the dilemma to 
design regulatory systems that are 
predictable enough for companies, 
investors and scientists to make 
rational decisions, but unambiguous 
enough to avoid a governance gap that 
could jeopardize public consent or give 
too much room to non-state actors. 
Against this backdrop, evolving and 
adaptive regulatory systems should 
be designed in a flexible manner to 
take into account changing socio-
economic conditions, new scientific 
insights and the discovery of unknown 
interdependencies.
In light of the complexities and 
rapidly changing nature of emerging 
technologies, governance should be 
designed in such a way as to facilitate 
dialogue among all stakeholders. 
For regulators, to dialogue with 
researchers at the cutting edge of 
developing these technologies is the 
only way to understand the potential 
future implications of new and highly-
technical capabilities. For the scientific 
community within and across certain 
fields, a safe space is needed to 
coalesce around a common language 
and have an open discussion around 
both benefits and risks. At the same 
time, given that risks tend to cross 
borders, so must the dialogue on how 
to respond. And given the power of 
public opinion to shape regulatory 
responses, the general public must 
also be included in an open dialogue 
about the risks and opportunities 
of emerging technologies through 
carefully-managed communication 
strategies. Governance will be 
more stable and less likely either to 
overlook emerging threats or to stifle 
innovation unnecessarily, if the various 
stakeholders likely to be affected are 
involved in the thinking about potential 
regulatory regimes and given the 
knowledge to enable them to make 
informed decisions.
2.5 Conclusion
Although the interplay between 
geopolitics and economics, 
urbanization and emerging 
technologies are three very different 
fields of enquiry, two common themes 
emerge: the importance of governance 
and the need for proactivity.
The analysis of the interplay between 
geopolitics and economics focuses 
attention on the need to find ways 
to minimize incentives for national 
governments to engage in negative 
tactics, including by making the 
mechanisms of global governance 
more effective in resolving tensions 
among nation states. As this interplay 
leads to regional institutions gaining 
in significance, proactive attention to 
the quality and effectiveness of their 
governance also becomes more 
important in creating the capacity to 
address risks. 
There is no doubt that urbanization 
will continue, so improving the 
governance of cities will be relevant 
to a broad spectrum of global risks. 
An opportunity also exists to be 
proactive in fostering more effective 
links between city governments around 
the world, for mutual learning and 
collaboration on risks that affect them.
Emerging technologies promise to 
play a leading role in improving the 
governance of smart cities, but also 
present risks. Proactivity is especially 
crucial here given that the risks that 
might emerge from entirely new fields 
of knowledge are impossible to predict. 
Effective governance at all levels, from 
industry codes of conduct to national 
regulations and global cooperation, 
will determine how well risks from 
emerging technologies are foreseen 
and minimized.
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Part 3:  
Good Practices on 
Risk Management 
and Risk 
Resilience
Introduction
Mitigating, preparing for and building 
resilience against global risks is a long 
and complex process, a necessity 
often recognized in theory but difficult 
in practice.1 Global risks transcend 
borders, meaning that often no single 
entity has the capacity and authority 
to address them. Multistakeholder 
collaboration is required but made 
difficult by misaligned incentives and 
uncertainties – those with the most to 
lose from a risk are often not those with 
the most power to address it. And the 
highly interconnected nature of global 
risks means they need to be addressed 
from multiple angles – although this also 
means that investments in risk mitigation 
and resilience can pay off in multiple 
areas.
Analysing and better understanding 
global risks is the first step towards 
successful efforts to address them. 
Risks must be effectively communicated 
to the public, government, business 
and civil society. Even then, action is 
more likely to happen if stakeholders 
have examples of good practice on 
which to draw. With that in mind, this 
year’s Global Risks report shares three 
examples of risk management and 
resilience practices related to extreme 
weather events.
The focus on extreme weather events 
is pertinent given that it tied with large-
scale involuntary migration at the bottom 
of the list when respondents to the 
Global Risks Perception Survey 2014 
were asked to rate what progress had 
been made in addressing each global 
risk over the past 10 years (see Figure 
3.1). Water crises and risks related 
to extreme weather events, such as 
natural disasters, major biodiversity 
loss and ecosystem collapse, are also 
in the bottom half of responses. In 
addition, water crises is the global risk 
that is perceived as the most potentially 
impactful in the coming decade (see 
Figure 1).
The impact of natural hazards is a 
combination of the frequency and 
intensity of the hazard with the 
vulnerability and exposure of people, 
assets and economic activities. 
Strengthening resilience is an attempt to 
reduce the exposure and ultimately the 
potentially catastrophic impact of natural 
hazards.
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The first practice presented here 
addresses water crises. In the coming 
decades, climate change will add to the 
pressure that economic growth and 
development are already putting on both 
groundwater and renewable surface 
water resources.2 As water is an issue 
that must be managed locally, proven 
local initiatives that can be adapted and 
replicated elsewhere are needed. The 
initiative described here was developed 
in Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin and 
has been transferred in other regions of 
Asia. 
Community-level action to build 
resilience is the focus of the second 
practice outlined below, the newly-
established Resilient America 
Roundtable. This highly promising 
initiative is helping selected local 
communities in the United States to 
understand their risk interconnections 
and design resilience strategies against 
risks, including extreme weather events. 
It is hoped that the lessons learned will 
enable many more communities to do 
the same. 
Figure 3.1: Global Risks for Which Most Progress Has Been Made within the Last 10 Years
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2014, World Economic Forum.
Note: Respondents were asked to select three global risks for which they believe most progress has been made to address them within the last 10 years. For legibility 
reasons, the names of the global risks are abbreviated. See Appendix A for the full name and description.
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The importance of adequate risk 
communication is a recurring theme in 
effective risk management practices, 
and it is at the heart of the third practice 
presented here – on raising public 
awareness about flood risks in Saxony, 
a region of Germany that is prone to 
significant flooding (ZÜRS Public). 
The examples showcased here are 
not intended to be exhaustive; they 
are selected sources of inspiration and 
a base for continuing this work in the 
future.
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Practice 1: Interdisciplinary 
Science for Managing 
Water Resources and 
Improving Long-Term 
Water Security
Securing a reliable supply of clean water 
has been one of the most important 
issues throughout human history. Water 
management involves mitigating four 
risks: shortages, including droughts; 
inadequate quality; flooding; and 
harming ecological systems.3 According 
to the United Nations:4
♦ Water use is growing at twice the 
pace of population growth. By 2025, 
two-thirds of the world population 
will be experiencing water “stress 
conditions”. 
♦ One in nine people lacks access to 
improved sources of drinking water 
and one in three lacks improved 
sources of water sanitation. This 
causes around 3.5 million deaths 
each year.
♦ Between 2000 and 2006, droughts, 
floods and storm surges killed 
almost 300,000 people and caused 
an estimated $422 billion worth of 
damage.
Climate change will increase the 
frequency and severity of droughts 
and floods and will lead to overall drier 
conditions in some world regions.5 This 
may heighten the risk of geopolitical 
destabilization and armed conflict: 
countries that share rivers have a 
statistically higher likelihood of armed 
conflict, and dry countries experience 
more conflict .6,7 The Jordan, Rio 
Grande, Mekong and Nile rivers are all 
especially associated with conflict risk.
The Murray-Darling Basin
Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin 
provides water for over 2 million people, 
including much of the city of Adelaide, 
as well as 40% of Australia’s agriculture. 
Unsustainable rates of water extraction 
had been decreasing flow volumes: in 
2007, the car ferry at the River Murray 
mouth was grounded for the first time in 
its 71-year history.8
There was a growing sense that 
something had to be done to ensure 
that the river system was not destroyed. 
Policy-makers realized that they 
urgently required a model that could 
provide credible and robust estimates 
of current and future water availability, 
to enable them to set equitable and 
efficient allocations for competing uses. 
However, such a model had not yet been 
designed, let alone built.
The complexity of modelling an entire 
river system – which requires handling 
vast amounts of often incomplete 
data from multiple sources of varying 
accuracy and reliability – had been 
insurmountable until recently. But prior 
investments in fields such as hydrology, 
mathematics, climate and statistics had 
paid off in the shape of advances that 
were making such a model possible. 
Then-prime minister John Howard 
identified it as a national priority and 
committed government funding.
First, climate patterns as well as 
individual models of groundwater and 
surface water inflows and outflows had 
to be developed, for different parts of 
an area larger than France. Then these 
individual models had to be brought 
together into a single, integrated model. 
Starting in 2006, a team of around 100 
people from 15 organizations developed 
ways to handle the uncertainties and 
link the models. The resulting system 
incorporated 70 individual ground and 
surface water models and over a century 
of climate data into a 61,000 gigabyte 
database – roughly the size of the US 
Library of Congress.
The project combined both blue-sky 
and applied research. It involved the 
development of new techniques for 
hydrological, environmental and climate 
modelling, with transparency and expert 
review to validate methods and build 
stakeholder trust. The project is the first 
rigorous attempt worldwide to estimate 
the impacts of catchment development, 
changing groundwater extraction, 
climate variability and anticipated 
climate change, on water resources at 
a basin-scale, explicitly considering the 
connectivity of surface and groundwater 
systems.9
Today the Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority – a government organization 
charged with managing the basin’s 
water resources – provides a real-time 
interactive website where anyone can 
view daily and yearly water levels, salt 
loads (electrical conductivity) and water 
temperatures at recording stations for 
all the basin’s major rivers. This provides 
traceability and transparency for critical 
decisions relating to water allocation. In 
a multistakeholder environment where 
allocation decisions can impact people’s 
livelihoods, trust in the data is critical for 
effective policy.
Figure 3.2: The Murray-Darling Basin in Australia
 
Source: CSIRO Land and Water Flagship
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Next-Generation Models
The general principles of the 
technologies pioneered in the Murray-
Darling Basin are applicable to other 
river systems, although they need to be 
adapted to the unique environmental 
features of each. This is now happening 
for the Mekong River Basin, one of the 
largest in the world, which covers China, 
Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia 
and Vietnam: over 60 million people 
depend on the Mekong for their water 
supply, and many hydropower plants are 
planned or under construction.
The science of river basin planning is 
also advancing to incorporate social 
science alongside the physical sciences 
in efforts to improve the resilience of 
social, economic and environmental 
systems. In a 2010 study with funding 
from the Australian overseas aid 
agency, the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO) and the Mekong River 
Commission developed six scenarios 
for the Mekong Basin to the year 2050. 
The Mekong Futures Project sought to 
understand the complex transboundary 
regional dynamics to improve decision-
making, ensure participatory processes 
and develop shared future visions. The 
CSIRO team working on the project 
had both physical and socio-economic 
science backgrounds.10
Another project will see yet more 
advanced techniques applied to model 
water availability, ecosystems and 
livelihoods for the Koshi River Basin, 
which stretches from China across 
the Himalayas, through Nepal and into 
the Ganges in India. In 2013, CSIRO 
commenced a collaborative four-year 
project with the International Centre for 
Integrated Mountain Development to 
inform transboundary water reforms.11 
Reliable information about how much 
water can be safely extracted from a 
river system is vital to help countries 
reach agreements on long-term water 
security.
As the models increase in sophistication, 
the challenge is to plug them into real-
world decision-making processes. 
Building the models is hard, but so too is 
convincing policy-makers to act on them 
when they point towards the need to 
make difficult choices.
Practice 2: Resilient 
America Roundtable
Floods, hurricanes, wildfires, windstorms 
and other natural hazards kill or injure 
thousands of people worldwide and 
cost billions of dollars in the United 
States each year. The factors that make 
a community resilient against these 
threats – able to protect against, absorb, 
mitigate, respond to or recover from 
them – differ greatly according to local 
circumstances. But many communities 
have not even begun to think about how 
to assess their resilience, let alone  
build it.
Started in January 2014, the Resilient 
America Roundtable initiative by 
the National Academy of Sciences 
aims to work with communities in a 
bottom-up way. Over a three-year time 
horizon, the purpose of the initiative 
is to initiate, nurture and learn from 
local efforts to measure and improve 
resilience. It emerged from interest 
in testing ideas included in the 2012 
US National Research Council report 
entitled Disaster Resilience: A National 
Imperative on reducing vulnerability 
to extreme events, decreasing their 
costs and mitigating their impacts. The 
Resilient America Roundtable has a 
strong multistakeholder component: 
initiated by nine federal agencies, it 
convenes experts from the academic, 
public and private sectors. The science 
community is represented by the 
National Academy of Sciences.
The Resilient America Roundtable has 
designed and is currently catalysing 
pilot projects in communities in South 
Carolina, Seattle/Tacoma and Iowa, thus 
offering a geographic representation 
by ranging from the west (Seattle/
Tacoma) to the middle (Iowa) to the east 
(South Carolina). The communities were 
selected based on criteria including their 
size, ethnic and economic diversity, 
the range and type of natural hazard 
risks they face and the presence of 
motivated community leadership to own 
and maintain the resulting community 
resilience strategy in the long term. 
The pilot projects are structured 
around four pillars: (i) understanding 
and communicating risk; (ii) identifying 
measures or metrics of resilience, 
including baseline conditions, milestones 
and definitions of the acceptable 
or unacceptable consequences of 
the identified risks; (iii) building or 
strengthening coalitions or partnerships 
in building community resilience; and 
(iv) sharing information or data related 
to better decision-making for building 
resilient communities. 
The pilot project initially involves five 
steps, the first two of which have been 
implemented. First, a Roundtable 
subcommittee makes visits to engage 
different community groups including 
the business community – local corner 
stores as well as multinational chains; 
local government agencies; emergency 
managers and first responders; and 
the local chapters of community-based 
non-governmental organizations such 
as the American Red Cross, the United 
Way, Points of Light and the Boys & Girls 
Clubs of America. Separate discussions 
are held with each about their views 
on resilience and what elements of 
quality of life must be maintained during 
emergency. Around 70-100 people have 
participated in these conversations so 
far in Iowa and South Carolina.
Second, 70 people are invited to play a 
specially-developed “Extreme Events” 
game, in which everyone chooses a 
role (first responder, individual, elected 
official, etc.) in a fictional Coastal City and 
makes decisions as a scripted scenario 
unfolds that involves a hurricane and 
other surprises. The game takes the 
players through the efforts of finding, 
sharing and distributing resources. Its 
purpose is to break the ice and build 
trust among the members of each 
community. The game will also be made 
available online.
Third, a set of interactive table top 
exercises will be developed to 
understand and map the specific 
interdependencies in each community. 
The pilots have identified certain 
“community priorities” as a basis for 
this exercise: in Charleston and Iowa, 
economic drivers have emerged as 
community priorities; in Charleston, 
priorities include cultural identity and 
tourism and, in Iowa, the thrust is on 
grain production and export.
Fourth, the community participants will 
be helped to work through a scenario 
of a disrupting event in which critical 
infrastructure fails. The goal is to highlight 
critical nodes, networks and functions 
that act as amplifiers or dampeners as 
the effects of a disrupting event cascade 
through the system. Finally, the resulting 
disruption map will identify the nodes 
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that require hardening or redundancy 
and that will be used as a basis to design 
the community’s resilience strategy.
In terms of barriers, the initiative relates 
to two overarching objectives: to build 
resilience at the community level; and, 
at a higher level, to gain insights into 
common themes and local variations 
on those themes to knit into a national 
or a larger-scale picture. Concerning 
the latter, the main challenge has, 
therefore, been to structure the pilot 
projects in such a way as to be able to 
glean common elements or themes 
from disparate communities. By using 
the same basic approach (the four 
pillars) in each community and seeing 
which elements of the framework play 
out, it is possible to understand the 
similarities and differences in how to 
build resilience and whether there are 
enough common issues that could be 
used as a basis to transfer the project 
to other communities. The big barrier 
for transferability would be if one were 
to find through the small sample that 
each community builds resilience in its 
own ways and that few or weak ties bind 
communities together.
Project-wise, the experience has shown 
so far that one of the main enabling 
factors for building community resilience 
to all kinds of risks is for the community 
to be functional and for the different 
pieces of that community to work 
together in a productive way. While a 
collegial and cooperative approach 
prevails in some communities from the 
outset, in others more time needs to 
be spent to build trust among different 
sectors and stakeholders. In addition, 
the key to maintaining momentum is 
local leadership: having somebody – 
whether an individual, an agency or 
an organization – take ownership of 
the community resilience strategy in a 
way that allows it to be resourced and 
maintained over time.
The Resilient America website (http://
resilientamerica.nas.edu) facilitates 
connections among the three pilot 
and other communities and will share 
the resulting information and lessons 
learned. It is hoped that the Resilient 
America Roundtable’s emphasis on 
risk communication and inclusive 
understanding of resilience will ultimately 
spark ideas for similar initiatives in other 
communities or countries.
Practice 3: ZÜRS Public – 
Increasing Awareness of 
Flood Risk in Saxony – A 
Practice on Risk 
Communication12
In August 2002, severe floods affected 
practically two-thirds of the German 
state of Saxony (Figure 3.3 illustrates 
the rivers in Saxony, Germany). This 
disastrous event led to the development 
of the Flood Protection Investment 
Programme, which comprises 1,600 
individual flood protection measures and 
548 flood risk maps for all communities 
at risk. A statewide risk awareness 
campaign was also launched.
To better communicate on flood risks, in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Saxony, 
the German Insurance Association 
(GDV) developed an online geographic 
information system, ZÜRS Public, where 
homeowners, tenants and businesses 
can see an exact calculation of the risk 
exposure to flooding, backflow, torrential 
rain and earthquakes of their individual 
address.13 While similar to other systems, 
such as Tiris in the Austrian region of 
Tyrol, it is innovative in its triangulation of 
data from insurers, the government and 
some 200 water management agencies 
across the federal states.14 The results of 
this online risk information tool are easy 
to understand and free of charge.
Since its establishment in 2001, the 
ZÜRS Public online risk assessment 
tool has covered some 20 million home 
addresses, 200,000 km of rivers, and is 
available in Saxony, Lower Saxony and 
Saxony-Anhalt. The GDV is working to 
develop it into a standardized tool for all 
of Germany. Currently the tool is being 
developed in Rhineland-Palatinate and 
Bavaria.15  Flood risk calculations are 
presented in four groups:
♦ high threat: statistically, floods occur 
at least once every 10 years
♦ medium threat: statistically, floods 
occur once every 10-50 years
♦ low threat: statistically, floods occur 
once every 50-200 years
♦ very low threat: statistically, floods 
occur less frequently than once every 
200 years
The initiative aligned the interests of 
all stakeholders and illustrates the 
importance of risk communication. 
Citizens benefit by understanding more 
about their individual risk exposure. 
The insurance industry is incentivized 
to participate as the tool encourages 
households and businesses to think 
about their need for insurance. The 
state also benefits from individuals and 
businesses taking greater responsibility 
for risk prevention, both through private 
insurance and investment in physical 
prevention measures, as it reduces their 
potential liability in the event of disasters. 
To raise awareness further, the state 
government transparently publishes 
information online about applications 
for and disbursements of public 
compensation for private damages.
Figure 3.3: The Rivers in Saxony, Germany 
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Conclusion
The three practices described in this 
section of the report illustrate how risk 
mitigation and resilience-building efforts 
can be driven by one stakeholder or 
can progress through a broad-based 
multistakeholder coalition. From an 
emphasis on data collection and 
analysis in the case of the Murray-Darling 
Basin, to community building around 
resilience in the United States and risk 
communication in Germany, they show 
how responses to environmental risks 
can be based at the community, regional 
or national levels, and highlight the 
importance of knowledge and capability 
transfer.
Building resilience means finding ways 
to change behaviours across sectors 
and systems, identifying the barriers that 
must be addressed and the enablers 
that should be leveraged. Readers of 
the Global Risks report are invited to 
submit suggestions for practices on 
risk management or risk resilience to be 
featured in future editions of the report.
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Our lives are very different today from 
when the first Global Risks report was 
published a decade ago. Little did the 
world imagine the possibility of the 
implosion of global financial markets 
that plunged the world into a socio-
economic crisis from which it is still 
struggling to emerge. The “real world” 
was nowhere near as interconnected 
with the virtual one: Twitter did not 
exist, Facebook was still a student-only 
service, and the iPhone and Android 
were still one and two years, 
respectively, away from their 
commercial release. The power of 
interconnectivity has since shown itself 
forcefully – be it from the convening 
power of the Arab Spring, the revelation 
of massive cyber espionage around the 
National Security Agency, or fast-
moving developments in new disruptive 
business models that are 
fundamentally changing the global 
economic landscape.
While increased interdependencies 
have brought the world closer together, 
the Global Risks report series 
emphasizes the other side of the coin: 
as people’s lives are becoming more 
complex and more difficult to manage, 
businesses, governments and 
individuals alike are being forced to 
decide upon courses of action in an 
environment clouded by multiple layers 
of uncertainty. Indeed, understanding 
their implications and raising 
awareness of the interconnection of 
risks are at the basis of the Global Risks 
report. On the upside, however, the 
world has not stood still: the 
importance of risk management and 
the need to build resilience has since 
become a top issue for decision-
makers who are recognizing that risks 
are no longer isolated but inherently 
dynamic in nature and crossing many 
spheres of influence. Against this 
backdrop, the need to collaborate and 
learn from each other is clearer than 
ever, an aspect that figures prominently 
in this year’s report by featuring 
initiatives that have demonstrated value 
and good practices that can be 
replicated elsewhere.
Ten years of “doing risks” has also led 
to the recognition that a short-term 
vision prevents addressing long-term 
issues. Some slower-moving trends 
have continued inexorably: the last 10 
years have brought conclusive proof 
that the earth’s climate is changing and 
that human activities are to blame – yet 
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progress to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions remains frustratingly slow. 
This lesson is reflected this year in the 
introduction of different time horizons 
and the differentiation between risks 
and trends. Hopefully these innovations 
will help many public and private 
organizations around the world 
address this aspect of human nature in 
mitigating risks and building resilience.
Indeed, our self-perception as homines 
economici or rational beings has 
faltered in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, whose effects are still unfolding 
socially, as persistent unemployment, 
ever-rising inequality, unmanaged 
migration flows and ideological 
polarization are among the factors 
stretching societies dangerously close 
to the breaking point. Social fragility is 
even threatening geopolitical stability, 
as breakdowns in cooperation within 
states make relations between states 
more difficult. And a quarter-century 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, interstate 
conflict is once again one of the key 
risks in terms of likelihood and impact. 
Yet the means through which conflicts 
can be pursued are growing more 
varied, as this report has explored – 
from geo-economic tools, such as 
trade sanctions, to cyber attacks on 
critical infrastructure, to the potential for 
a new arms race in lethal autonomous 
weapons systems.
We are not powerless in the face of 
these concerns. As highlighted 
previously, multistakeholder 
collaboration and global governance 
are key to building resilience and 
mitigating risks. From major inter-
governmental conferences in Sendai 
and Paris to the finalization of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, the 
year 2015 presents an unprecedented 
range of opportunities to take collective 
action to address global risks.
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Global Risk Description
Asset bubble in a major economy Unsustainably overpriced assets, such as commodities, 
housing, shares, etc., in a major economy or region
Deflation in a major economy Prolonged ultra-low inflation or deflation in a major 
economy or region
Energy price shock to the global economy Sharp and/or sustained energy price increases that place 
further economic pressures on highly energy-dependent 
industries and consumers
Failure of a major financial mechanism or institution Collapse of a financial institution and/or inefficient 
functioning of a financial system with implications 
throughout the global economy
Failure/shortfall of critical infrastructure Failure to adequately invest in, upgrade and secure 
infrastructure networks leads to a breakdown with 
system-wide implications
Fiscal crises in key economies Excessive debt burdens generate sovereign debt crises 
and/or liquidity crises
High structural unemployment or underemployment A sustained high level of unemployment or underutilization 
of the productive capacity of the employed population
Unmanageable inflation Unmanageable increase in the general price level of 
goods and services in key economies
Extreme weather events (e.g. floods, storms, etc.) Major property, infrastructure and environmental damage 
as well as human loss caused by extreme weather events
Failure of climate-change adaptation Governments and businesses fail to enforce or enact 
effective measures to protect populations and to help 
businesses impacted by climate change to adapt
Major biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse 
(land or ocean)
Irreversible consequences for the environment resulting 
in severely depleted resources for humankind as well as 
industries such as fishing, forestry, pharmaceuticals
Major natural catastrophes (e.g. earthquake, 
tsunami, volcanic eruption, geomagnetic storms)
Major property, infrastructure and environmental damage 
as well as human loss caused by geophysical disasters 
such as earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, 
tsunamis or geomagnetic storms
Man-made environmental catastrophes (e.g. oil 
spill, radioactive contamination, etc.)
Failure to prevent major man-made catastrophes causing 
harm to lives, human health, infrastructure, property, 
economic activity and the environment
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Global Risks
A global risk is defined as an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, can cause significant negative impact for several 
countries or industries within the next 10 years.
Table A.1: Description of Global Risks 2015
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Global Risk Description
Failure of national governance (e.g. corruption, illicit 
trade, organized crime, impunity, political deadlock, 
etc.)
Interstate conflict with regional consequences A bilateral or multilateral dispute between states escalates 
into economic (e.g. trade/currency wars, resource 
nationalization), military, cyber, societal or other conflict
Large-scale terrorist attacks Individuals or non-state groups with political or religious 
goals successfully inflict large-scale human or material 
damage
State collapse or crisis (e.g. civil conflict, military 
coup, failed states, etc.)
State collapse of geopolitical importance due to internal 
violence, regional or global instability and military coup, 
civil conflict, failed states, etc.
Weapons of mass destruction Nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological technologies 
and materials are deployed creating international crises 
and potential for significant destruction
Failure of urban planning Poorly planned cities, urban sprawl and associated 
infrastructure create social, environmental and health 
challenges
Food crises Access to appropriate quantities and quality of food and 
nutrition becomes inadequate, unaffordable or unreliable on 
a major scale
Large-scale involuntary migration Large-scale involuntary migration due to conflict, disasters, 
environmental or economic reasons
Profound social instability Major social movements or protests (e.g. street riots, social 
unrest, etc.) disrupt political or social stability, negatively 
impacting populations and economic activity
Rapid and massive spread of infectious diseases Bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi cause uncontrolled 
spread of infectious diseases (for instance due to resistance 
to antibiotics, antivirals and other treatments), leading to 
widespread fatalities and economic disruption
Water crises A significant decline in the available quality and quantity of 
fresh water, resulting in harmful effects on human health 
and/or economic activity
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure and 
networks
Systemic failures of critical information infrastructure (e.g. 
Internet, satellites, etc.) and networks negatively impact 
industrial production, public services and communications
Large-scale cyber attacks State-sponsored, state-affiliated, criminal or terrorist large-
scale cyber attacks cause an infrastructure breakdown 
and/or loss of trust in the Internet
Massive incident of data fraud/theft Criminal or state-sponsored wrongful exploitation of private 
or official data takes place on an unprecedented scale
Massive and widespread misuse of technologies 
(e.g. 3D printing, artificial intelligence, geo-
engineering, synthetic biology, etc.)
Massive and widespread misuse of technologies, such 
as 3D printing, artificial intelligence, geo-engineering and 
synthetic biology, causing human, environmental and 
economic damage
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Inability to efficiently govern a nation of geopolitical 
importance due to weak rule of law, corruption, illicit trade, 
organized crime, impunity or political deadlock
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Trends
A trend is defined as a long-term pattern that is currently taking place and that could contribute to amplifying global risks 
and/or altering the relationship between them.
Table A.2: Description of Trends 2015
Trend Description
Ageing population Ageing of populations in developed and developing countries driven by declining fertility 
and decrease of middle- and old-age mortality
Climate change Change of climate attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the 
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate 
variability
Environmental 
degradation
Deterioration in quality of air, soil and water from ambient concentrations of pollutants 
and other activities and processes
Growing middle class in 
emerging economies
Growing share of population reaching middle-class income levels in emerging 
economies
Increasing national 
sentiment
Increasing national sentiment among populations and political leaders affecting 
countries’ national and international political positions
Increasing polarization of 
societies
Inability to reach agreement on key issues within countries due to diverging or extreme 
values, political or religious views
Rise of chronic diseases Increasing rates of non-communicable diseases, also known as chronic diseases, 
leading to long-term costs of treatment threatening recent societal gains in life 
expectancy and quality, placing a burden on economies
Rise of hyperconnectivity Increasing digital interconnection of people and things
Rising geographic 
mobility
Increasing mobility of people and things due to quicker and better performing means of 
transport and lowered barriers
Rising income disparity Increasing socio-economic gap between rich and poor in major countries or regions
Shifts in power Shifting power from state to non-state actors and individuals, from global to regional 
levels, and from developed to emerging market and developing economies
Urbanization Rising number of people living in urban areas, resulting in the physical growth of cities
Weakening of 
international governance
Weakening or inadequate global or regional institutions’ (e.g. the UN, IMF, NATO, etc.) 
agreements or networks, and loss of trust in them, increasing the global power vacuum 
and preventing effective solutions to global challenges
Global Risks 201556
Appendix B:  The Global Risks Perception Survey 2014 and   
   Methodology
As discussed in Part 1, the Global Risks 
2015 methodology was reviewed last 
year for this edition. A number of 
workshops, interviews and discussions 
were held with experts and with the 
Advisory Board, taking into account 
lessons from past editions as well as 
developments in the global risks 
landscape. The concept of trends was 
introduced in both the survey and the 
report and some of the global risks 
analysed in the past were relabelled 
and classified under a different 
category or better defined as trends.
The Global Risks Perception Survey 
(GRPS or survey) was adjusted 
accordingly to capture the main 
aspects of both risks and trends and to 
assess their interconnectedness and 
impact on societies. The following 
section describes the survey and 
methodology in greater detail. 
Figure B.1: The Global Risks Perception Survey Sample Composition
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Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2014, World Economic Forum.
Note: Reported shares are based on number of valid responses: Gender: 895 responses; Expertise: 883; Organization type: 885; Age distribution: 882; Region: 847.
The Global Risks 
Perception Survey
The Global Risks Perception Survey, 
discussed in Part 1, is the main 
instrument for assessing global risks 
and trends in this report. The survey 
was conducted between mid-July and 
the end of September 2014 among the 
World Economic Forum’s 
multistakeholder communities of 
leaders from business, government, 
academia and non-governmental and 
international organizations.1
Raw responses were cleaned to 
improve overall data quality and 
completeness. All questionnaires with a 
completion rate of below 50% were 
dropped, reducing the number of 
available responses from 1,120 to 896. 
In 12 cases, the respondent did not 
provide any information about gender, 
but it was possible to infer this 
information from the other records 
provided (first and last names). 
Similarly, 101 respondents did not 
indicate the region in which they are 
based and were manually assigned to 
one on the basis of their country of 
residence. Among the respondents, 
43% completed the survey last year. 
Details of the sample composition are 
reported in Figure B.1.
The graph below shows the profile of 
the 896 survey respondents. To 
capture the voice of youth, the survey 
also targeted the World Economic 
Forum’s community of Global 
Shapers.2 Those under 30 years of age 
accounted for approximately one-fifth 
of respondents. 
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The Global Risks 
Landscape 2015 (Figure 1)
Respondents were asked to assess the 
likelihood and global impact of each of 
the 28 risks. For each risk, they were 
asked, “How likely is this risk to occur 
globally within the next 10 years?” and 
“What is the estimated impact globally if 
this risk were to materialize? (Impact is 
to be interpreted in a broad sense 
beyond just economic consequences)”. 
The possible answers ranged from 1 
(“very unlikely” and “low” impact, 
respectively) to 7 (“very likely” and 
“high” impact, respectively). 
Respondents were given the possibility 
to choose a “Don’t know” option if they 
felt unable to provide an informed 
answer. For each risk, partial 
responses, i.e. those assessing only the 
likelihood or only the impact, were 
dropped. A simple average for both 
likelihood and impact for each of the 28 
global risks was calculated on this 
basis. Formally, for any given risk i, its 
likelihood and impact, denoted as 
likelihood
i and impacti, respectively are:
trends are the most strongly 
connected with risks? Please select at 
least three pairs and up to six pairs 
from the 13 trends below (you can 
select the same trend and risk more 
than once).” The information thus 
obtained was used to construct the 
risks-trends interconnections map 
included in the inside cover flaps of the 
report.
In both cases, a tally was made of the 
number of times each pair was cited. 
To obtain normalized connection 
weights, this value was divided by the 
count of the most frequently cited pair 
and, in addition, this ratio was square-
rooted to dampen the long-tail effect 
(i.e. a few very strong links, and many 
weak ones) for display and presentation 
purposes. Of the 378 possible pairs of 
risks, 122, or 32%, were not cited. 
Similarly, of the possible 364 trend-risk 
combinations, 116, or 32%, were not 
cited. Formally, the intensity of the 
interconnection between risks i and j (or 
between trend i and risk j), denoted as 
interconnectionij, corresponds to:
likelihood =
1
Ni
likelihoodi,n
Ni
n=1
i
impacti=
1
Ni
impacti,n
Ni
n=1
where likelihoodi,n and impacti,n are 
respectively the likelihood and impact 
assigned by respondent n to risk i and 
measured on a scale from 1 to 7. Ni is 
the number of respondents for risk i 
who assessed both the likelihood and 
impact of that risk.
The Global Risks and Risks-
Trends Interconnections 
Maps (Figures 2 and 3)
To draw the global risks 
interconnections map presented in Part 
1, survey respondents were asked to 
answer the following question: “In your 
view, which are the most strongly 
connected risks? Please select at least 
three pairs and up to six pairs from the 
28 risks below.”
In addition, respondents were asked to 
identify three to six pairs of strongly 
connected trends and risks, 
disregarding directions of causality. 
This question read: “In your view, which 
where N is the number of respondents. 
Variable pairij,n is 1 when respondent n 
selected the pair of risks i and j as part 
of his/her selection. Otherwise, it is 0. 
The value of the interconnection 
determines the thickness and 
brightness of each connecting line in 
the graph, with the most frequently 
cited pair having the thickest and 
brightest line.
In the global risks and risks-trends 
interconnections maps (Figures 2 and 
3), the area of each node 
(corresponding to a risk or a trend) is 
scaled according to the number of 
times the corresponding risk or trend 
was cited as a part of the connection 
pair.
The placement of the nodes was 
computed using ForceAtlas2, a 
force-directed network layout algorithm 
implemented in Gephi software, which 
minimizes edge lengths and edge 
crossings by running a physical particle 
simulation.3 
interconnectionij=
pairij,n
N
n=1
pairmax
with pairmax =maxij ( pairij,n
N
n=1 )
The Risks of Highest 
Concern (Figure 1.1)
Although the report generally focuses 
on a time horizon of 10 years, 
respondents were asked to identify the 
risks of highest concern within two 
different time frames: 18 months and 
10 years. To identify the top 10 global 
risks of highest concern, described in 
Part 1, respondents answered the 
following question: “In this survey, we 
are looking at risks within the next 10 
years. For this question only, please 
select the five global risks that you 
believe to be of most concern within 
the next 18 months and 10 years, 
respectively.” For any given risk i from 
the list of 28 risks, the share of total 
respondents (N = 896) that declared 
being concerned about that risk was 
derived as follows:  
with ci,n equal to 1 if respondent N 
selected risk i as a risk of concern and 
0 otherwise. The risks with the 10 
highest shares were selected as the 
risks of most concern. 
Progress and Preparedness 
(Figure 1.7 and Figure 3.1)
Survey respondents were asked to 
identify up to three risks for which they 
felt most progress to address them has 
been made over the past 10 years. 
Similarly, they were asked to select up 
to three risks which they believed their 
region was least prepared for.4
For any given risk i from the list of 28 
risks, the share of total respondents (N 
= 896) who think that most progress 
has been made in addressing that risk 
was calculated as follows: 
% concer ni
1
N
ci,n
N
n=1
% progress i=
1
N
pi,n
N
n=1
with pi,n equal to 1 if respondent N 
selected risk i, and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, the share of total respondents 
who thought that their region is least 
prepared for risk i was obtained:
with ri,n equal to 1 if respondent N 
selected risk i, and 0 otherwise.
% preparednes s i=
1
N
ri,n
N
n=1
Global Risks 201558
Appendix C:  The Executive Opinion Survey and Views of the  
   Business Community on the Impact of Global   
   Risks on Their Business
Every year since 1979, the World 
Economic Forum conducts the 
Executive Opinion Survey (EOS). This 
survey captures invaluable information 
on a broad range of socio-economic 
issues. In the 2014 edition, over 13,000 
executives in 144 economies were 
surveyed.5 
The 2014 edition of the EOS, conducted 
between February and May 2014, for 
the first time included a question on the 
risks of biggest concern. More 
specifically, respondents were asked to 
select the five global risks that they 
were most concerned about for doing 
business in their country and to rank 
these five risks from 1 (for the one of 
highest concern) to 5 (for the one of 
lowest concern).
This list of 19 global risks (Table C.1) in 
the EOS is different from that used in 
the present report, although a majority 
of risks on the former list do appear on 
the latter, albeit slightly reformulated in 
some cases. The EOS list was 
established before the Global Risks 
Perception Survey (GRPS) 
methodology was reviewed and a 
number of risks were redefined or 
excluded and others were introduced. 
In addition, whereas the GRPS was 
agnostic about the impact of global 
risks on a particular group, the EOS 
question specifically asked about the 
impact on the ability to do business in 
the respondent’s country. Furthermore, 
the EOS did not specify any time 
horizon, unlike the GRPS which 
considered a 10-year horizon. Finally, 
the size and nature of the two samples 
of respondents differed significantly: a 
multistakeholder group of experts in the 
case of the GRPS and business 
executives in the case of the EOS. 
For these reasons, the results of the 
GRPS and EOS are not strictly 
comparable. Instead, the EOS results 
provide a complementary perspective 
– that of businesses on the impact of 
global risks on their businesses.
To rank the 19 risks based on the level 
of concern, each received a score 
derived from the rank assigned by 
respondents, from 5 for the risk the 
respondent ranked first, to 1 for the risk 
ranked fifth (all non-cited risks were 
assigned a score of zero). As a second 
step, for each economy the sum of 
points obtained by each risk across all 
responses from that economy was 
divided by the total of points distributed 
across all risks in the economy. The risk 
score thus obtained was used to 
establish a country-level ranking.6 
Figure C.1: Global Risks of Highest Concern for Doing Business, Per Country
Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2014, World Economic Forum.
Note: Only risks that are of highest concern in at least two countries are represented on the map. Other risks of highest concern: Violent interstate conflict (in Armenia), 
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure and networks (Cameroon), Escalation of economic and resource nationalization (Lesotho), and Greater incidence of 
environmentally-related events (Philippines).
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Figure C.2 reports the results at the 
global level, as well as for the two main 
development status groups, advanced 
economies and emerging market and 
developing economies.7 Aggregate 
scores correspond to the average 
scores of each risk across all 
economies belonging to the group of 
interest.
Figure C.1 shows a snapshot of the 
data on a map. Based on the results, 
fiscal crises is the risk of highest 
concern for doing business in 93 (65%) 
of the 144 economies covered by the 
survey, well ahead of oil price shock 
and profound political and social 
instability, both of which come first in 13 
economies (9%). The map in Figure C.1 
is shaded according to the risk of 
highest concern. Within a troubled 
geopolitical context, a fragile and 
uneven recovery in advanced 
economies, and a slowdown in many 
emerging economies, it is not 
surprising that economic risks are 
those of most immediate and highest 
concern to businesses.
In advanced economies, concerns 
about economic risks are even higher. 
Fiscal crises is the risk of highest 
concern in 30 of the 35 advanced 
economies. In Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland, failure of a major financial 
mechanism or institution is the one of 
highest concern, whereas liquidity 
crises is the risk of top concern in 
Portugal and Spain. 
Among emerging market and 
developing economies, fiscal crises is 
the risk of highest concern – by far – 
but oil price shock comes second, 
followed by liquidity crises. Prolonged 
neglect of critical infrastructure ranks 
fourth; a major obstacle to business 
development, economic integration 
and trade performance, it is the main 
concern in Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, 
Paraguay and Uganda.
Interested readers can visit the Global 
Risks report’s portal at  
www.weforum.org/risks to access the 
results for individual economies and 
regions.
Figure C.2: Global Risks of Highest Concern for Doing Business, for Advanced 
Economies and Emerging Market and Developing Economies
Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2014, World Economic Forum.
Note: From the list of global risks above, respondents were asked to select the five global risks of highest concern 
for doing business in their country and to rank them between 1 (most problematic) and 5. The bars in the figure 
show the responses weighted according to their rankings.
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Table C.1: The Executive Opinion Survey 2014 List of 19 Global Risks 
Fiscal crises in key economies*
Failure of a major financial mechanism or institution*
Liquidity crises
Oil price shock to the global economy**
Prolonged neglect of critical infrastructure and its development needs**
Greater incidence of environmentally related events (weather, natural 
catastrophes, man-made catastrophes)**
Water crises*
Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation**
Major escalation in organized crime and illicit trade
Large-scale terrorist attacks*
Violent interstate conflict with regional consequences**
Escalation of economic and resource nationalization
Food crises*
Pandemic outbreak**
Profound political and social instability**
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure and networks*
Escalation in large-scale cyber attacks**
Massive incident of data fraud/theft*
Mismanaged urbanization**
* denotes risks included in both the Global Risks Perception Survey and the Executive Opinion Survey
** denotes risks whose definition was redefined for the Global Risks Perception Survey 2014
Source: Executive Opinion Survey 2014, World Economic Forum. 
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Endnotes
1 See http://www.weforum.org/communities
2 The Global Shapers Community is a network of hubs developed and led by young people who are exceptional in 
their potential, achievement and drive to make a contribution to their communities. See http://www.weforum.org/
community/global-shapers.
3 See Jacomy et al., 2012. 
4 Respondents could select the region they were based in from the following list: Europe, Central Asia including 
Russia, East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle-East and North Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, North America, and Oceania.
5 For more information about the Survey, see Browne et al. 2014.
6 By construction in each economy, the sum of risk scores is therefore 100.
7 Development status classification is from the International Monetary Fund (situation as of April 2014).
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